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Chapter 1. Introduction: North Korean schools where?! 
On one of the most enjoyable days of my fieldwork, I was sitting on a blanket in the sun. I 
had just bought some bulgogi, marinated meat for a Korean barbecue, at a university fair in 
Tokyo. There was live music, the atmosphere was great, the food was delicious. The flag of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea, was flying high. 
 As of 2012, there are 135 North Korean schools (朝鮮学校 , Chōsen gakkō, 38 
kindergartens, 54 elementary schools, 33 middle schools, and 10 high schools) located all 
over Japan, and one North Korean university (朝鮮大学校, Chōsen daigakkō), situated in 
Tokyo.
1
  
Due to financial worries and controversies (such as a university teacher being accused 
of being a spy
2
), student numbers have dwindled in recent years. These schools, usually for 
Zainichi Koreans – Korean permanent residents of Japan –, teach a North Korean inspired 
curriculum, with classes such as (North) Korean language, history, and ideology. The schools 
range from kindergarten to university, and while they are not classified as ‘regular’ schools 
(Chōsen Gakkō are what are called ‘miscellaneous’ schools, with the same accreditation as 
driving schools
3
), they are full-time schools, attended instead of Japanese schools. While 
ethnic schools are not uncommon in many countries, Japan is the only country that allows 
North Korean schools to operate.  
 Chōsen gakkō are part of a much larger organization called Chōsen Sōren (Chongryon 
in Korean), which is short for Zai-Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai or General Association of 
Korean Residents in Japan. Chōsen Sōren is the official organization of Koreans in Japan who 
identify with North Korea, and thus represents the interests of (North) Koreans in Japan. Not 
only does it oversee schools, it also manages companies and banks; different branches of 
Chōsen Sōren organize events and meetings, and it is even the de facto embassy for North 
Korea, since Japan and the DPRK do not have diplomatic relations. Chōsen gakkō are the 
largest and most publicly visible branch of Chōsen Sōren, and its ties with North Korea have 
made it into a highly controversial and sensitive issue in Japan. 
This controversy has been fomented by the actions and military ambitions of the North 
Korean state. In 2017 up until September alone, North Korea’s government has launched 14 
                                                 
1
 Mitsuishi Park, Shitte imasuka, Chōsen Gakkō. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. 2012. 
2
 "Kankoku-nai kōsaku-in wa jikkei Chōsen Ōmoto jun kyōju, shiji ka supai katsudō." Asahishinbun dejitaru. 
February 04, 2016. 
3
 ZaiNihon Chōsenjin jinken kyōkai. "Mainoriti no kodomo-tachi ni taisuru kyōiku kikai no teikyō ni okeru 
sabetsu ―― Chōsengakkō no kodomo-tachi o chūshin ni." Nipponseifu ni yoru UPR kankoku jisshi ni kansuru 
ngo repōto, March 30, 2017, 2. 
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long-range missiles, causing tensions in the East-Asian region to flare up again, with some of 
the missiles landing in Japan’s economic zone, and two flying directly over Japanese land.4 In 
September 2017, it conducted yet another nuclear test.
5
 These acts of aggression have had an 
impact on how anything North Korea-related is perceived by the Japanese government as well 
as by the public. 
Although North Korea has the reputation of being a ‘hermit kingdom’, this does not 
mean it is not influenced by, and in turn influences, other countries. Within Japan, Chōsen 
Sōren, and in line with this Chōsen gakkō, are seen by the Japanese government as agents of 
North Korean influences. To counter this influence domestically, the Japanese government 
has always put restrictions on Chōsen gakkō, most recently in 2013, when the Abe 
government excluded Chōsen gakkō from the High School Tuition Waiver Programme 
(TWP).
6
 This subsidy makes highschool education free of charge in Japan, and, generally, all 
parents receive this subsidy, even those with children at different ethnic schools. Chōsen 
gakkō are the only schools that are not eligible for the Tuition Waiver Programme, creating a 
difficult financial situation for the parents and the schools. In addition, local governments are 
free to decide whether they want to add subsidies to Chōsen gakkō instead of being obligated 
to do so, as they are for other schools. These domestic measures have met with international 
consequences. Not only does the DPRK claim that there is discrimination against what it still 
considers its citizens,
7
 but several United Nations (UN) committees have since spoken out 
about what they report as ethnic discrimination against these schools.
8
 Such international 
statements are one of the reasons why this issue is so complicated. 
It seems strange that the Japanese government would even allow these schools to exist 
in present-day Japan, especially when looking at the military manoeuvres of the DPRK, and 
the incredibly poor relations between Japan and North Korea. The reasons mentioned above 
                                                 
4
 "North Korea fires second ballistic missile over Japan." BBC News. September 15, 2017. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41275614. 
5
 Collins, Pádraig. "North Korea nuclear test: what we know so far." The Guardian. September 03, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/03/north-korea-nuclear-test-what-we-know-so-far. 
6
 Ito, Masami. "Pro-Pyongyang schools barred from tuition waiver." The Japan Times. February 21, 2013. 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/21/national/pro-pyongyang-schools-barred-from-tuition-
waiver/#.WcfUrLJJaM8 
7
 Tokyo District Court's Unjust Decision on Korean Students in Japan Slashed." KCNA Watch. September 21, 
2017. https://kcnawatch.co/newstream/280495/tokyo-district-courts-unjust-decision-on-korean-students-in-
japan-slashed/. 
8
 United Nations Committee of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. "Concluding observations on the 
combined seventh to ninth periodic reports of Japan." International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, September 26, 2014. 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/JPN/CO/7-
9&Lang=En. 
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make dealing with Chōsen gakkō a sensitive issue, and it seems that especially the Abe 
government has been trying to obstruct the activities of Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō. 
In this thesis, I will investigate the Japanese government’s management of the Chōsen 
gakkō issue (Chōsen gakkō mondai, as it is called in Japan) under the current Abe-
administration. In particular, I want to understand government’s policy relating to these 
schools, especially when keeping in mind that its stance on North Korea itself is much more 
hardline than its stance on DPRK influences domestically. The fact that these schools exist 
and the government’s stance on them is not as hardline as might be expected, might imply that 
certain official groups are benefiting from their existence. The overarching research question 
therefore is, “who benefits from Chōsen gakkō in Japan?” To start with, this issue raises 
questions that will be answered in Chapter 2, such as “How did these Chōsen gakkō come into 
existence in Japan in the first place?”, “What is the Japanese government’s strategy regarding 
DPRK-Japan relations?”, and “What is the place of the (North) Korean minority in Japanese 
society?” In addition, the literature review will show the gap in the literature that I am trying 
to fill, namely that the issue of Chōsen gakkō has never been researched from a Japanese 
government’s policy perspective, let alone with the theoretical framework used in this thesis. 
The research question taps into different aspects of the Chōsen gakkō issue, thus creating a 
multi-faceted research.  
In Chapter 3, I will discuss in-depth my theoretical framework, which consists of a 
specific version of the International Relations (IR) theory called Constructivism, which 
focuses heavily on situational identity formation in relation to an ‘other’, and on legitimation 
strategies of actors on the basis of these created identities. This framework will help in 
discerning how the Japanese government positions itself against Chōsen Gakkō and vice versa, 
and will provide the foundation for analysing who benefits from this situation by explaining 
the stakes for both parties in the form of legitimation strategies. This chapter will also explain 
why I chose to use an IR theory for a seemingly domestic issue. 
Chapter 4 will deal with the methodological framework of this research. In this chapter 
I will discuss the data and their relevance and significance, and how they will be used. By 
conducting a qualitative political discourse analysis, I will try to answer the research question 
at hand. Chapter 4 covers both the theory behind ‘discourse’, as well as how to use discourse 
analysis methodologically. Here, I will also discuss the Japanese language component of the 
research, as well as the limitations of my data. 
The analysis will be described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Firstly, I will analyse the 
perspective of the North Korean community and the Chōsen gakkō. While the focus of this 
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research lies on the Japanese government’s stance and policy, it is impossible to pretend that 
Chōsen Gakkō is merely an object in this debate. It reacts to the actions of the Japanese 
government, creating a dynamic that has to be discussed. Secondly, I will focus on the way in 
which the Japanese government has been dealing with Chōsen gakkō and what the results of 
these interventions have been. I will also try to discern the underlying reasons for the 
government’s approach, and assess whether the current situation is actually beneficial to the 
Japanese government or not. This will be shown through various themes that keep resurfacing 
when looking at the data. Domestic struggles with an institution that is likened to a third party, 
in this case the DPRK, do have an impact on relations with said party, and often involve 
ulterior motives. I believe that it is important to thoroughly research and discuss these aspects, 
because not only do they have an impact on domestic politics and the situation for Koreans in 
Japan, they may also have an impact on an international level. After analysing these two sides, 
I will show how the Japanese government and Chōsen Gakkō identify each other and seek 
legitimation, in order to ultimately answer the question of who benefits from the political and 
societal situation of Chōsen gakkō in Japan. 
Finally, there will be a concluding chapter, which summarizes the findings and will 
suggest a tentative advice as to how the situation might be handled differently. I argue that the 
Japanese government does not differentiate in its discourse between Chōsen Sōren and 
Chōsen gakkō, which creates a lopsided policy. The Japanese government tries to diminish 
North Korea’s and Chōsen Sōren’s influence, but does so by targeting schools. Within the 
Chōsen community, the discourse is much more diverse. The Chōsen community does not 
feel that the schools are part of Chōsen Sōren, but just a way to express ethnic identity, not a 
political one. They feel that Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō are separate. This does not mean 
that Chōsen gakkō do not show some distressing signs, but it shows that, if the government is 
to tackle the issue of North Korean influence, it has to provide a more tailor-made policy, and 
treat Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren as two different entities. Currently, both the Japanese 
government and  Chōsen Sōren (coincidentally) benefit from the actions of the Japanese 
government. Chōsen Sōren benefits because the government’s actions are perceived as 
discriminatory, and in this way Chōsen Sōren can show that it is the one who truly cares for 
the Chōsen minority. As stated above, the issue of ethnic schools in different countries is not a 
new or unknown one. I would like to argue that, while this case is a unique one, the 
conclusions that we can draw from this research can have greater implications and relevance, 
especially when looking at the current situation in some countries and their struggles with 
religious schools (for instance The Netherlands and Islamic Salafist schools).  
10 
 
Because the different groups and organisations in Japan often have names that do not 
translate well into English, I will use the Romanised versions of the words. This means that 
Chōsen gakkō (North Korean school) and Chōsen Sōren will be the words used in this thesis. 
Japanese words do not have singular or plural, so unless a specific school is mentioned, 
Chōsen gakkō as a term is to be taken as the collective of the schools. In addition, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 2 as well, there is a divide in the Zainichi Korean community in Japan, 
so whenever referring to the North Korean community, I will henceforward refer to it as the 
Chōsen community or Chōsenjin (people of Chōsen) because the distinction is an important 
one to make, and also because the term Chōsen is more accurate than the term ‘North Korean’. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Background Overview 
As discussed in the introduction, the existence of Chōsen gakkō is highly contested in Japan. 
This literature review aims to give a review of the existing literature surrounding the issue of 
government attitude towards Zainichi Chōsenjin as a minority, North Korea and its 
aggressions, as well as to give a short historical overview of the events that have led to the 
existence and the contestation of Chōsen gakkō.  
It is important to note that this chapter will not focus on the schools themselves, in that 
it will not discuss the schools’ operations and educational decisions. There are few academic 
works that focus on Chōsen gakkō at all, and when they do focus on it, it is either to advocate 
for more rights for the schools
9
, or to explain how the school system works, how children 
learn
10
 and how Chōsen gakkō show ethnic diversity.11 Ryang has devoted a book to the 
linguistic switch Korean children make when they get  taught in Korean but speak Japanese at 
home, and how they deal with it.
12
 In Japanese, there are more books and articles but they too 
focus on the same issues, with titles like “Do you know about Chōsen gakkō” (shitte imasuka, 
Chōsen gakkō)13 and "Why Parents Choose Korean Schools: Seeking a Safe Space and/or 
Reasonable Choice"(Chōsengakkō hogo-sha no gakkō sentaku riyū: `Anshin dekiru 
ibasho'`atarimae' o motomete).
14
 In addition, almost all of these texts have been written 
before 2010, over seven years ago. Since the scope of my research is Prime Minister Abe’s 
second premiership, from when he came to office in 2012 to the present (this will be 
elaborated upon in Chapter 4), these works are outdated. While the academic works on those 
topics are interesting as a background to Chōsen Gakkō, they do not have a place in my 
research, since the main object of focus is the attitude of the Japanese government. This 
stance broaches the main gap in the literature.  
There is no academic literature that focusses on government attitudes to Chōsen gakkō, 
or on the discourse surrounding Chōsen gakkō from the Japanese government’s perspective. 
                                                 
9
 Hiroshi Tanaka, "Chōsengakkō no sengo-shi to kōkō mushō-ka (tokushū kōkō mushō-ka seido to 
Chōsengakkō)." 〈Kyōiku to shakai〉 kenkyū 23 (2013): 55-68 and Ryuta Itagaki, "Chōsengakkō e no iyagarase 
saiban ni taisuru iken-sho." Hyoronshakai kagaku 5 (2013): 149-85. 
10
 Sonia Ryang, Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin. London: Routledge. 2000. and Tomoko 
Nakajima, "Chōsengakkō no futatsu no shikumi to Nihon shakai: 〈Jiko kanketsu tōitsu shisutemu〉 to 
〈Chōsengakkō komyuniti〉 ni chūmoku shite (tokushū kōkō mushō-ka seido to Chōsengakkō)." 〈Kyōiku to 
shakai〉 kenkyū 23 (2013): 77-86. 
11
 Kyongho Cho, "Zainichichōsenjin no esunikku aidentiti no tayō-sei ni kansuru chōsa kenkyū ― Nihon gakkō 
zai gakusei to Chōsengakkō zai gakusei no hikaku o chūshin ni." Ta gengo ta bunka: Jissen to kenkyū 5 (2013): 
100-120. 
12
 Sonia Ryang, North Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology and Identity 
13
Mitsuishi Park, Shitte imasuka, Chōsen gakkō. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. 2012. 
14
 Tomoko Nakajima, "Chōsengakkō hogo-sha no gakkō sentaku riyū: `Anshin dekiru ibasho'`atarimae' o 
motomete." Journal of Poole Gakuin University 51 (2011): 189-202. 
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The literature that exists, focuses on the policies the Japanese government has enacted (such 
as the TWP), whether or not these are discriminatory.
15
 All works that mention the Chōsen 
community in combination with the Japanese government, usually only discuss North Korea 
or Chōsen Sōren. When they do mention Chōsen gakkō, it is often only as part of the 
community that exists, or as part of Chōsen Sōren. Chōsen gakkō in government context is 
never a topic in its own right, as the overview below will demonstrate. This is the major gap 
in the literature that the present research will address.  
This chapter will first discuss the issue of Koreans in Japan and its history of 
colonialism and discrimination, as this is also the starting point for how and why Chōsen 
gakkō were established. It will also elaborate upon minorities in Japan in general, and show 
how the Japanese government has treated the Chōsen community different from other 
minority groups. This is relevant for the rest of this thesis as well, in understanding my 
theoretical approach for the research at hand. 
Secondly, I will explain the North Korea-Japan relations, and how these have shaped 
government attitudes towards the Chōsen community, as well as the personal convictions of 
Prime Minister Abe. The Japanese government’s reactions to DPRK action and aggression 
have helped shape the environment in which Chōsen gakkō operate. This section will also 
touch upon the specific stance of the Abe government in relation to the Chōsen community. 
While there is much to be said about the history of the Chōsen community, North Korea and 
Japan, I will limit myself to an overview of the events essential for this project because of 
time and word constraints. 
Both sections demonstrate how very intertwined these two subjects are, and that what 
seems a domestic issue, namely specific ethnic schools in Japan, actually constitutes a much 
broader issue. This will be briefly discussed at the end of this chapter. What will become clear 
from this chapter is that the divide between the Japanese government on the one side and the 
Zainichi Chōsenjin on the other side has always been prominent. It has been reinvigorated in 
recent years, thus setting up a perfect ‘us vs. them’ situation, as will be explained in Chapter 3.  
 
2.1 Koreans in Japan: Struggles in the making for generations 
 Since Korea’s annexation in 1921, Koreans had been taken to Japan to work there as 
cheap labourers. Because they came from the colonies, and because they often did not speak 
                                                 
15
 Such as: Yoko Motani, “Towards a More Just Educational Policy for Minorities in Japan: The case of Korean 
ethnic schools” Comparative Education 38: No. 2 (2002): 225-237. And Tomoko Tokunaga and Beth Douthirt-
Cohen, “The Ongoing Pursuit of Educational Equity in Japan: The accreditation of Ethnic High Schools” Equity 
and Excellence in Education 45, no. 2. (2012): 320-333. 
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the Japanese language well or were not very highly educated, they were looked down upon 
and were primarily considered second-rate citizens. One of the earlier examples of friction 
between the Koreans in Japan and the Japanese citizens took place during the great Kanto 
earthquake of 1923, when, after rumours of sabotage (Koreans poisoning in the wells, 
Koreans placing bombs) and fear of the Korean independence movement, over 6.000 Koreans 
(some estimates go as far as 10.000) were killed in vigilante violence, sometimes with the 
help of the government.
16
 According to Choi, the stereotype of Koreans as rowdy and 
untrustworthy has remained in Japanese society to this day.
17
 During the following decades, 
Koreans worked in Japan and tried to build a life, unable to go home. Especially during WWII, 
Korean cheap labour was used in military factories.  
After WWII had ended and Japan had surrendered, it proved to be difficult for the 
Japanese government to decide what to do with all the Korean workers. Military factories 
were closed down, and many Koreans lost their jobs. Since most were not fluent in Japanese, 
and they were not Japanese citizens, it was difficult to claim benefits.
18
 In the San Francisco 
Treaty of 1951 it was decided by Japan and the United States that Koreans would not be 
granted Japanese citizenship The Republic of Korea (ROK) government, however, refused to 
let all the Koreans return to South Korea because of the economic burden this would impose 
on the country.
19
 When in 1950, before the San Francisco Treaty, the Korean War broke out 
and many Koreans in Japan felt trapped, they set up their own organizations in Japan in order 
to defend the few rights that they had. After the Treaty, they defended their rights as “long-
term special residents”, the classification given to the Koreans by the Japanese. These Korean 
organizations were also split between communist and capitalist versions, just like the two 
parties fighting in the Korean War. In 1955, the communist Korean organization cut its ties 
with the Japanese communist party (with which it had been working together because of their 
similar goals and ideology) due to conflicts of interests, and moved on independently. Thus, 
Chōsen Sōren was founded: a communist organization solely dedicated to Koreans in Japan.20  
After the Korean War, South Korea was in ruins, while North Korea flourished with 
the help of the Soviet Union and China. Not only did North Korea express a desire for a mass 
repatriation of Koreans in Japan to the “fatherland”, which was eventually made possible by 
                                                 
16
 Jin Seok Choi, "Zainichi Chōsenjin and the Independence Movement in Everyday Life." International Journal 
of Korean History 17, no. 2 (August 2012): 37-38. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Sonia Ryang, North Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology and Identity, 113. 
19
 Sonia Ryang, Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin. London: Routledge. 2000, 32-33. 
20
 Ibid., 33. 
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the DPRK and the Red Cross,
21
 but in 1957, it also started to provide Chōsen Sōren with 
financial aid - partly for Korean education in Japan.
22
 While the Japanese government did not 
agree with this and tried to ban it, at the same time it did not do anything to aid the Koreans in 
Japan. After a couple of harsh demonstrations by the Koreans against governmental attitudes 
and attempts to silence them, the Japanese government decided it was easier to just give in, 
and Koreans were left to do what they wanted in their schools.  
This also meant, however, that Chōsen gakkō were not accredited as “real” schools, 
but as “miscellaneous schools” (such as driving schools), as already mentioned in the 
introduction. Because the Japanese government was too busy rebuilding the country, and 
because Koreans could not be Japanese citizens, they were often seen as a nuisance by the 
government and by society. The Zainichi Koreans having their own organisation as well as 
another nation to take care of them was actually quite useful for the Japanese government, 
because it did not have to pay attention to the precarious situation of the Koreans: another 
country was doing that for them.
23
  In the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea still had the financial 
means to support Chōsen Sōren, and the number of schools, as well as Chōsen Sōren 
membership, thus grew exponentially. It was not until the 1980s that the roles were reversed, 
and that Koreans in Japan, who now benefited from a better economic situation and more 
rights and freedom in Japan, were asked to provide for family members who had repatriated 
to North Korea, and to support the regime financially via Chōsen Sōren.24  
 
2.2 Minorities and the Japanese Government 
Koreans in Japan were not the only minority group that faced differential treatment 
from the Japanese government. Many others faced discrimination and negligence. As, 
amongst others, Weiner and Kibe state, Japan was often, and still sometimes is, portrayed 
both by scholars and Japanese politicians as a homogeneous country, with people that look 
and act the same, ignoring ethnic background and culture of minority groups, essentially 
sometimes portraying Japan as a racist country.
25
 Kibe also reiterates, however, that this view 
of Japan as a homogeneous country, is an “untenable” one.26 According to Tokunaga and 
                                                 
21
 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 2007. Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War. Lanham, MD etc.: 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
22
 Sonia Ryang, Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin, 34. 
23
 Sonia Ryang, North Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology and Identity. 113. 
24
 Sonia Ryang, Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin, 45-46. 
25
 Takashi Kibe, “Differentiated Citizenships and Ethnocultural Groups: A Japanese Case.” Citizenship Studies 
10, no. 4. (2006): 414 and Michael Weiner. Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeinity. Xv. 
26
 Takashi Kibe, “Differentiated Citizenships and Ethnocultural Groups: A Japanese Case.” 414 
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Douthirt-Cohen, in 2010 the amount of registered foreigners had seen an increase of 26.5% in 
comparison with the prior ten years.
27
  
Japan has also changed in terms of allowing or encouraging naturalization for 
foreigners and long-term special residents. While dual-citizenship is still not possible, and in 
the past the rules and regulations for naturalisation were strict and invasive; a “cultural and 
spiritual assimilation”,28 currently the procedure is much less complicated.29 In addition to 
this, the Ministry of Justice has taken out some of the prerequisites that many minorities, 
including Koreans, found off-putting, such as the need to take on a Japanese name.
30
 It is now 
much easier for most foreigners to naturalize without having to give up their ethnic identity 
completely; they are still allowed to have associations, schools and their own names.  
While the number of Chōsenjin naturalising has been rising over the past decade, part 
of the minority still refuses to naturalise because they still “consider naturalisation under the 
current system as unhelpful [for the objective to retain ethnic identity and cultural heritage] 
because of the strong pressure of assimilation.”31 The reason that this stance is contradictory 
to the changes and trends described above is that the Chōsen minority is being treated 
differently than other minorities when it comes to rights, and to the right to retain an ethnic 
identity. Even though the Japanese government has not opposed the expression of cultural 
heritage and identity (such as the major China and Korea towns in large Japanese cities), and 
Shipper argues that the government never promoted but also did not oppose the development 
of Chinese and Korean associations,
32
 Chōsen Sōren and the Chōsen community are being 
opposed by the Japanese government. Kibe researched the differences in rights in Japan 
between the Ainu minority and the Korean minority in Japan, and found that the Ainu had the 
most rights, with the South Korean minority in second place, and the Chōsen community 
last.
33
 Restrictions that have been put on Chōsen gakkō are evidence of this. 
Another example of this opposition in relation to Chōsen gakkō is that in 2003 the 
Japanese government promulgated a policy to validate ethnic highschools. This meant that, 
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instead of having to take an additional highschool equivalent test before being allowed to 
participate in a university entrance exam, students from ethnic highschools could immediately 
partake in the entrance exam.
34
 While this policy was first drawn up to only validate British 
and American highschools, after protest the government revised the policy to include all 
ethnic highschools (Chinese, Brazilian, South Korean, Indonesian), except ones with roots in 
countries that Japan did not have diplomatic ties with.
35
 This excluded the Chōsen gakkō 
solely on the basis of the lack of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan. 
The different treatment of the Chōsen minority as opposed to other minorities in Japan 
can be explained from the literature on North Korea-Japan relations, as well as on Prime 
Minister Abe’s goals in government. The next section will cover the main points the literature 
provides on why the Chōsen minority is a special case in Japan. 
 
2.3 Japan-North Korea Relations: Apologies, Abductions and Arms 
While it seems almost absurd now, after the Korean War Japan was much closer with 
North Korea than it was with the South. Because of aid from the Soviet Union and China, the 
DPRK was allowed to flourish, while the ROK was hastily put together under US supervision, 
turning into an authoritarian regime that would last until well into the seventies.
36
 As 
discussed in section 2.2, the DPRK showed great interest in repatriating Koreans to Korea, 
something the ROK did not want to do. For the Japanese government, which did not really 
know what to do with all the Koreans now in Japan, this was a very welcome solution.
37
 In 
the 1970s there were a few attempts at formally normalizing Japan-DPRK relations and 
establishing trade treaties, but these never materialised.
38
 Thus, for a while it seemed that 
relations with North Korea would normalize sooner than those with South Korea.  
This changed drastically in the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had fallen and hence its 
aid to North Korea ceased. In 1990, the first Japanese delegation went to Pyongyang to 
negotiate the release of Japanese sailors whom North Korea had arrested for entering Korean 
territory. During these talks, both sides negotiated for peace, stability and new market 
prospects. The DPRK demanded apologies for Japan’s wartime and colonial aggression in 
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return for the release of the Japanese sailors. The Japanese government apologized, the DPRK 
government released the sailors, and the diplomatic crisis seemed to have cooled.
39
 While the 
DPRK started its own missile program and launched its first missile in 1993 and had launched 
its own nuclear program, this did not stop the Japanese government from sending another 
delegation, providing rice aid to North Korea during the great famine in 1995, thus keeping 
relations tense but still existent. In 1999, after another missile test in 1997, Japan started 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) research together with the US, signalling to North Korea 
that it was not going to stand idly by while the latter shot missiles towards Japanese 
territory.
40
 Meanwhile, in Japan rumours emerged that some people who went missing during 
the 1960s and 1970s were actually kidnapped by North Korea. While to most this seemed too 
preposterous to be true, there were several politicians who took up the cause of these families, 
most notably Abe Shinzo
41
, who would later become Japan's prime minister. In 2002, the then 
prime minister Koizumi Junichiro organized the ‘Pyongyang Summit’ and visited Kim Jong-Il 
to again try and negotiate normalized relations.
42
 This summit was seen as sensational, 
because it took place at the time when the American president George W. Bush had just 
named North Korea as an ‘Axis of Evil’ country, and had confronted the DPRK with its 
nuclear program despite having signed the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).  
Another reason for the summit’s sensational character was that Japan again issued an 
apology for wartime and colonial aggression. But the most controversial aspect, something 
that no one had expected, was that Kim Jong-Il offered his apologies for North Koreans 
having kidnapped Japanese citizens (albeit not at his command), thereby acknowledging for 
the first time that the DPRK was indeed involved in the kidnappings.
43
  As will be explained 
below in more detail, this event has been covered in Japan endlessly, and has become, as Sato 
states, “the symbol of brutality and untrustworthiness of the Kim-regime.”44 The abduction 
issue, or rachi-mondai in Japanese, became more heated because Kim stated that five of the 
abductees had already died, and he refused to let the others return to Japan. After long 
negotiations, they were allowed to visit Japan, but the Japanese government then refused to let 
them return to the DPRK, thus creating more animosity between the nations.  
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In 2004, prime minister Koizumi tried again to get the DPRK to investigate the 
abductions, and as a result received the remains of one of the most well-known abductees, 
Megumi Yokota, whose story had been used to educate the Japanese people regarding the 
abduction issue. A DNA-test (to this day highly contested) showed that the remains were in 
fact not Ms Yokota’s, which again sparked outrage among the Japanese people.45 Since that 
time, North Korea has conducted many more missile tests as well as nuclear tests, but the 
abduction issue remains one of the most important and emotional issues in Japan. 
This overview of Japan-North Korea relations is necessary, because it illustrates which 
major acts of aggression have happened and what has elicited the strongest response from the 
Japanese government. Thus, it can be used in order to interpret the Japanese government’s 
position, and subsequently how it falls in line with its attitude towards Zainichi Chōsenjin. 
This will be of paramount importance for piecing together the status quo, and will help to 
show how in this environment both the Japanese government and Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen 
gakkō frame their legitimation towards their supporters.  
 
2.3.1 The Abduction Issue 
The abduction issue also gives us a glimpse already of the ways in which the Japanese 
government has interacted and still interacts with North Korea. While some scholars, like 
Hughes, have argued that the Japanese stance on North Korea has always been designed for it 
by the US, Hagström argues that this is in fact false, and that we can see Japan actively 
diverging from the US’s stance by focussing on the abduction issue. 46 After the Pyongyang 
Summit, the Japanese government was sometimes even seen as an obstruction, when, for 
instance, it was transfixed by the issue (and refused to give priority to other issues) during the 
Six Party Talks, where the US, ROK, China, Russia, the DPRK, and Japan were trying to end 
the missile and nuclear crisis.
47
 Thus, Japan charted its own course its dealings with North 
Korea. When he became prime minister, Abe held a speech in which he stated that Japan 
could not count on the international community, because no other nation could understand the 
Japanese tragedy of the abductions.
48
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Similar prioritizations could also be seen in the domestic sphere, when in 2006 a new 
law was enacted to promote countermeasures against North Korean provocation. The official 
name of this law was “The Law on Countermeasures to the Abduction Problem and other 
Problems of Human Rights Violations by the North Korean Authorities.”49 Clearly, “other 
problems” were inferior to the abduction problem.  
It is important to add to this trend that, as mentioned above, Abe Shinzo started 
cultivating his stance on North Korea long before he became prime minister. In fact, 
according to Lee, his hardline stance against the DPRK, and his actions during the time of the 
Pyongyang Summit, have made him popular amongst the Japanese people. For instance, he 
was the one who lobbied for the abductees to be forbidden to return to North Korea after they 
had visited Japan.
50
 When in 2012 he became prime minister again (after a short stint in 2006), 
solving North Korea and the abduction issue was one of the major themes that had helped him 
win the elections.
51
 But this isn’t Abe’s only major pledge. Perhaps his most important goal is 
a revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution,
52
 which states that:  
“[…] the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. […] land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”53 
 
 One of the possible justifications for altering the constitution and allowing Japan to 
have an army that can act outside Japan’s borders is an international threat to Japanese and 
regional safety, and North Korea very much fits that description. 
Abe Shinzo is not the only one who has been constantly fighting for the abduction 
issue and against North Korea. Ever since the official apology by Kim Jong-Il, Japanese 
media, politics and society have been in what Morris-Suzuki calls a state of “nationalistic 
hysteria” concerning North Korea.54 Japanese media have been near saturated with news on 
the abduction issue, condemning North Korea and anyone who tried to speak positively or to 
call for normalization and negotiations. Ever since, every time the DPRK launches a missile 
or conducts a nuclear test, the same sentiment flares up again, subsequently causing problems 
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for anyone who looks like they sympathize with North Korea, and, as will be discussed more 
in depth below, the Korean community.
55
 These reactions have become a vicious circle, 
which, as I will try to demonstrate, has set the tone for the current struggle between the 
Japanese government and the North Korean schools. As Lynn states, “Public opinion, 
maintained by a trinity of conservative political lobbies (such as Abe), viewer rating 
responses and broadcasting strategies ultimately constricted the government policy agenda, 
range, and choice in dealing with North Korea […]” (parentheses mine).56  
In short, the stage has been set for Abe Shinzo to continue his vicious fight against 
North Korea and his focus on the abduction issue, and to use this as well to further his goal of 
constitutional revision. Because of the “constricted range of views through narrow 
coverage”57 by Japanese media, public sentiment has been backing these viewpoints on North 
Korea with  vigour.   
 
2.3.2 Historical Revisionism 
In addition to Prime Minister Abe’s stance on North Korea as described in the 
previous section, there is another aspect of his views relevant to the interaction with the 
Korean community in Japan. In Japan, there exists in conservative right-wing groups (such as 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to which Abe belongs) a trend of ‘historical revisionism’. 
This means that they want to revise the way Japanese history is being perceived. They feel 
Japan has been portrayed for too long as the aggressor of East Asia (due to colonialism and 
WWII), Japan should stop apologizing for it, and Japanese people should be proud of their 
history.
58
 This stance has been widely criticised by many Asian countries who bore the brunt 
of Japanese violence, but especially so by Koreans (both in Japan and abroad), who feel that 
the war crimes committed by the Japanese, such as the issue of the comfort women, have not 
been taken seriously enough, and that the Japanese have not repented for it.
59
 Prime Minister 
Abe supports the revisionist stance. In fact, before becoming prime minister, he used to be the 
head of an organisation of historical textbook revisionism, which has the task of rewriting 
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history textbooks so as to appear more favourable for Japan.
60
 For instance, in one of these 
revisions, it has eliminated all references to comfort women from history textbooks in 
Japanese junior highschools.
61
 Tying into this is the fact that Prime Minister Abe is also 
reluctant to welcome diversity within Japan. In one of his books, he notes that people cannot 
be separated from their country of origin, unless they completely give it up and assimilate, 
which is what they should do when they come to Japan.
62
  
These nationalistic and revisionist sentiments, both within the LDP but also coming 
from Abe personally, not only show the divide between the Korean minority and the Japanese 
government, but also how schools and education get dragged into politics. Many of the 
Koreans want to pay respects to their heritage, and still feel the old wounds from the colonial 
times. The fact that the prime minister recognizes neither creates a difficult situation to 
operate in. 
  
2.3 North Korea “hysteria” 
From the overview discussed so far, it is clear that, historically speaking, many Koreans in 
Japan felt favourably towards the North Korean regime. Where the ROK government as well 
as the Japanese government had let them down, especially in the first decade after the Korean 
War, the North Korean government showed that it cared for its citizens, even if people 
originally did not come from the northern part of Korea. It also becomes clear how deep the 
feelings of discrimination and inequality run for Koreans in Japan, who were mainly left to 
fend for themselves. This discrimination is still palpable today. The North Korea hysteria, as 
Morris-Suzuki calls it, has been going on for more than a decade now, with the abduction 
issue, missile tests and nuclear program headlines resurfacing often, creating a discourse of 
fear and threat.
63
 The Korean community, especially the Chōsen community, suffers from the 
media attention North Korea has been receiving in Japan, as Hook, Mason and O’Shea 
describe, “[The risks surrounding North Korea] have also resulted in a disproportionate set of 
risks being posed to the everyday security of domestic actors associated with North Korea.” 64 
These authors argue that the recalibration of risks from North Korea by both the Japanese 
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government and the Japanese media has never taken into account the tremendous damage it 
does to the Korean community, so that the Japanese government’s pretence of ‘protecting all 
of Japan’ is a hollow one.65 I would argue that the stance that Hook et al. are taking is a bit too 
generalizing. It paints the Korean community as a passive pawn in this scenario, instead of 
one that acts and counteracts when the Japanese media, government or grassroots movements 
accuse or threaten it. The authors also do not differentiate between organisations and people, 
something that is a very important factor in explaining the reactions of and to Chōsen Sōren 
and Chōsen gakkō, as I will argue in Chapter 5. Chōsen Sōren has always proudly displayed 
its strong ties with North Korea, even after it was accused of having aided the DPRK in the 
abductions of Japanese citizens. Chōsen Sōren has always denied involvement in this and 
other North Korean actions, but has nevertheless hardly ever denounced aggravations by 
North Korea.
66
 
 This is not to say that Koreans in Japan do not experience serious discrimination. 
Within Japan’s growing nationalism both in society and in the government, minority groups 
such as the Zainichi Koreans often find themselves between a rock and a hard place. One of 
the main right-wing groups, the Zaitokukai
67
, has staged protests in various ethnic Korean 
neighbourhoods in Japan, demanding that “Koreans go home” and “All Korean women 
should get raped”.68 These hateful protests culminated in a lawsuit after a protest had been 
staged outside a Korean primary school, where children had been intimidated and yelled at, 
and the school had to close down for a couple of days.
69
 The Zaitokukai’s claim that Koreans 
get special rights that they do not deserve sounds utterly ridiculous to people whose ancestors 
had been forcibly brought to Japan, had been killed, used as sex slaves (the so-called ‘comfort 
women’), and then ignored, neglected and looked down upon during the occupation of Japan 
after WWII. Koreans in Japan and their grassroots movement have had to fight hard and 
continuously for the rights they and their offspring have today, and this is something not to be 
taken lightly. 
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 Chōsen gakkō were (and are still today in a lesser way) a “home away from home”, a 
place where Korean children were allowed to be Korean without being looked down upon. It 
was a place for restoring identity and pride after having been abandoned by both the Japanese 
and South Korean governments.
70
 On top of that, Chōsen Gakkō and Chōsen Sōren allowed 
Koreans to regain a liberated identity after two wars first took their people, and then took their 
home and ripped it in half.
71
 For many Koreans in Japan, Chōsen gakkō still is a way to find a 
cultural identity, a place where they belong, or to help their children gain awareness of their 
background. At the same time, it also seems strange that in an era where the Chōsen 
community experience freedom and rights unlike before, it would support an authoritarian 
regime. This is one of the bottlenecks for many Japanese people with regard to Chōsen gakkō. 
 
2.4 Domestic Issues going International 
 As this chapter has shown, the major bottlenecks when discussing the situation of 
Zainichi Koreans are twofold. First, Zainichi Koreans still are a marginalized group within 
Japanese society because of their heritage, and because of old wounds from the colonial 
period, WWII, and the Cold War. This position of having to fight extra hard for their rights 
and their place in society has kept alive a love for a homeland most of them have never seen; 
a dream of being recognized. Second, the current Japan-North Korea relations, and the 
frequent North Korean aggravation and its portrayal by the Japanese government and the 
Japanese media, have put Zainichi Koreans in a worse position than before. This is not to say 
that Chōsen Sōren pledging allegiance to a hostile nation known for its human rights abuses is 
not very problematic to say the least. Nevertheless, the Zainichi Chōsen sentiment has to be 
understood in order to properly assess the issue at hand. 
 It becomes clear that the minority issue is not a domestic issue. The Japanese 
government and also Chōsen Sōren keep bringing North Korea into the equation. The fact that 
Chōsen gakkō were not verified as ethnic schools because of a lack of diplomatic ties, 
reaffirms the notion that this is not an issue that stays within the domestic sphere.  As we have 
seen from the literature, the DPRK’s actions and the responses of the Japanese government 
and media play a significant part in understanding the position of Zainichi Chōsenjin. Chapter 
3 will elaborate on constructivism, the IR theory used for the present research, and will 
explain more in depth the reasons why it fits with the topic of Chōsen gakkō. 
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Chapter 3. Theory: Relational Constructivism 
 
3.1 Regular Constructivism 
Constructivism is known as one of the three mainstream international relations theories, 
together with realism and liberalism. In this chapter, I will first explain the principles of 
constructivism in general, and how it functions as a framework. Secondly, I will delve deeper 
into the specific type of constructivism that I will use, namely relational constructivism, and 
how I will connect this to the issue at hand. In the final part, I will discuss how and why I am 
using an international relations theory for an issue that at first glance is a domestic one. 
Constructivism gained prominence in IR, when the then prominent international 
relations theories (Realism, Liberalism and Marxism) failed to predict the run and outcome of 
the Cold War. Constructivism has its origins in sociology and in linguistics, and with 
influences from these disciplines, it studies discourse from a wider spectrum than previous IR 
theories. It states that “identities and interests are socially constructed by the particular way in 
which we interact with each other.”72 In this sense, constructivism is a much more empirical 
theory than the other two mainstream theories, which mainly rely on abstract concepts. 
Constructivism takes into account that, as Adler, one of the founders of the theory, stated, 
“social reality emerges from the attachment of meaning and functions to physical objects; 
collective understandings such as norms, endow physical objects with purpose and therefor 
help constitute reality.” 73  This means that, in order to understand policies and issues in 
politics, we have to look at why these norms and understandings are attached to specific 
objects, functions and positions in government bodies and society as a whole. These 
relationships and identities, between people, institutions and bodies, are at the heart of what 
constructivism tries to utilise to understand international relations. All people in a society 
enforce a discourse, or a paradigm, with institutions that we allow to exist (that we think are 
logical in our society), whether we actually make use of these institutions or not. We share a 
common understanding of what the relationship between us and the institutions, and between 
the institutions themselves entail, and because of our expectations, we usually act in a way 
that enforces the status quo.
74
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3.2 Relational Constructivism 
Relational constructivism is one path within the broader spectrum of constructivism in general.  
Relational constructivism differs from ‘regular’ norm-constructivism in that it does not focus 
on the norms that are in place in a specific discourse, but it focusses on the relation between 
actors and between actions and issues. It can “causally account for the victory of the policies 
empirically enacted and do so while preserving human agency.” 75  Within relational 
constructivism, there seem to be two main points of focus. Interestingly, while these two 
aspects are frequently discussed by scholars, they are never actively discussed together. I 
believe that both these approaches, while never using each other by name, are very useful 
when put together, and for that reason this thesis will use both. First, I will explain both of the 
aspects, and then I will argue why I decide to use both of them together, and how I will 
combine them into the solid ‘relational constructivism theory’ that they, I believe, should 
already be.  
 
3.2.1 Defining Legitimation 
The first aspect of relational constructivism concentrates on legitimation as a mechanism. In 
contrast to norm constructivism, where internalization and social learning are often the point 
of focus, relational constructivism puts the emphasis on ongoing contestation and rhetorical 
struggles. It focusses on social transaction instead of norms.
76
 For my research, this implies 
that the framework that will be used will rely heavily on how actors legitimate their positions 
towards other actors and towards the public, and why they legitimate their stances the way 
they do. As we will also see later in the second aspect of relational constructivism, the focus is 
never so much on “how” as on “why”.   
Because, according to Jackson, this branch of constructivism acknowledges smaller 
actors (so not just “the government” as an actor, but the different groups and people within a 
government as the actor), it is possible to gather more information on why a decision is 
made.
77
 This means that, for instance, I will not just look at “the Japanese government”, but 
for instance more specifically at the Japanese Diet, the Public Security Intelligence Agency 
(PSIA), and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG). These entities have been chosen 
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because they all approach the issue of Chōsen gakkō from different starting points while being 
part of the same government, and because of access restrictions within my fieldwork.   
One of the main reasons for actors’ power and privileged position is legitimation. First, 
however, we must define what legitimation exactly means. Jackson uses Max Weber’s 
musings on this concept,  
“No form of rule voluntarily contents itself with only material or only emotional or only 
value-rational motives as prospects for its continuation. On the contrary, each seeks to 
awaken and to foster the belief in its “legitimacy”. But according to the kind of 
legitimacy claimed, the type of obedience, the type of administration designation to 
guarantee it, and the character of the form of rule exercised all differ fundamentally – 
along with their effects.”78 
 
Jackson sees two consequences in this explanation of legitimation: (1) “legitimacy” is 
sociologically constructed and; (2) is linked to patterns of social actions in a context, not to 
individuals.
79
 This means that constructing legitimation is not solely done by an individual or 
by an institute in a void, but is done within a discourse in which actions take place. The 
discourse and the social actions have an influence on how and why legitimation is constructed 
by these actors.
80
 Explaining the normative value of legitimation is a slippery slope, because it 
can never be empirically tested. This is why relational constructivism chooses to focus on the 
empirical and historical process of how notions were made usable for legitimating an action. 
Thus, I can evaluate how legitimation came to be without trying to normatively evaluate it. 
It is important to note that, in order for legitimation to work, we do not have to assume that 
either the receiver or the sender of legitimating rhetoric necessarily believes in what they are 
conveying/receiving.  Legitimation simply is the “public pattern of justifications for a course 
of action.”81 By looking at the pattern of public claims made, and by understanding the 
discourse within that (public) sphere, we can learn to understand why a certain legitimating 
rhetoric is being deployed. This relation between discourse and public claims made by actors 
as a way of understanding the legitimation of policy and policy change is what marks this 
branch of relational constructivism.  
So how can this concept of “legitimation” be used in empirical research? If we want to 
take the outcomes as a starting point of the research (in this case, the policies enacted and 
actions taken by various branches of the Japanese government), we then have to backtrack to 
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why these policies were implemented, and legitimating rhetoric can help with this. Jackson 
writes,  
“policymakers enact those policies that they can justify in a manner acceptable to their 
audience; the configuration of the boundaries of acceptable action, produced and 
reproduced in the course of ongoing political struggle over policy outcomes, are central 
to the explanation of those outcomes. (emphasis mine)”82  
 
I emphasised the word ‘boundaries’ here, because legitimation in general is a crucial 
aspect of how boundaries are constituted, and because this term is also particularly important 
in the explanation of the second branch of relational constructivism.  
Legitimating rhetoric as part of relational constructivism fits perfectly with the notion 
that constructivism found its origins in linguistics and sociology. It is a form of speech 
designed to create a dominant discourse in a situation. It is important as well to relate this 
form of speech to the social and historical context in which it is articulated and which is 
simultaneously used to create the basis for its claims.
83
 
 This notion of legitimating rhetoric is also the starting point for Jackson’s analysis of 
legitimation, which is twofold. First, one has to determine the dominant social discourse 
within a society (because if political actors were not aware of the dominant discourse, they 
would not be able to reach their target audience), and second, one then has to investigate how 
this dominant discourse is linked to the justification and deployment of a specific policy or 
action.
84
 How this directly relates to my research will be explained in a different section of 
this chapter. Doty adds to this that a deployment always creates a discourse as well as reacts 
to it.
85
 A pattern of policy deployment tells us as much about the actor as it tells us about the 
world. 
 One of the important aspects of constructivism that this branch fails to reiterate in-
depth, but which still sits at the base of being able to understand actors and their legitimation, 
is identity formation. Fortunately, this will be covered in the next section. 
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3.2.2 Illegitimate differences: Diversity without Unity 
The second aspect that relational constructivism focusses on is identity formation. Hagström, 
one of the key authors on relational constructivism, is an avid user of this approach.  
The first pillar of relational constructivism is not mentioned by Hagström, but does 
automatically flow from his explanation of how identity is created by identity entrepreneurs. 
 According to his approach, identity is “reminiscent of a dependent rather than an independent 
variable, paying less attention to the impact of identity on behaviour or policy.”86 In other 
words, it does not treat identity as a catalyst of behaviour or policy, but as a part of behaviour 
or policy. This is important to note, because it constructs a different way of explaining 
policies or issues. Within norm constructivism, identity is seen as an independent variable, 
something that together with other variables creates the stage for a policy or behaviour that is 
then a stand-alone product. “Norm constructivists believe that identity matters primarily as a 
determent of national interests, which in turn they believe to function as a source for security 
policy.”87 Hagström sees identity as part of that final product, not as an independent variable 
for it. It is precisely how the dichotomy between domestic/international is constructed that 
constitutes identity, and thus it is not only a product of the national sphere (which is then 
transferred to the international sphere). It is also a product of the international sphere, thus 
making it dependent not only on the nationality of the country in question, but also on the 
country of focus. As Rumelili summarizes: “Identities are always constituted in relation to 
difference because a thing can only be known by what it is not.”88 The the case of my 
research, policies surrounding North Korean schools in Japan are not only in line with the 
Japanese government’s identity, they are in line with the identities of various Japanese 
institutions as influenced by North Korea. This is why North Korea-Japan relations are so 
important for a case study or an issue that is technically a domestic politics issue. 
The question asked here is not “how does identity influence foreign policy?”, it is 
“how is the identity constructed against an ‘other’ and why is this dichotomy chosen within 
this foreign policy?”. This inherently creates a different variable than identity for relational 
constructivists, which is the legitimation as described above.  
As I mentioned above, this construction of identity also means that there are multiple 
actors with one and the same identity, and that there can be multiple identities used for one 
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issue. The identity of the Japanese government is differently constructed than the identity of 
the Japanese public, even though they both would be considered as Japanese identity. This 
creates a grand role for what Hagström calls identity entrepreneurs. “Identity entrepreneurs 
are political actors who promote their desired versions of identity through the discursive 
representations of issues and actors.” 89 They have the power to promote and alter identity to a 
certain extent, and to use it for their or their organisation’s benefit.  
The example of Japan as ‘a peace-loving harmonious society’ has been constructed by 
different actors for different purposes, especially when discourses and issues are pitted against 
each other. We can see this in the assertion of Japan as a harmonious society, where the 
Japanese government uses it to reassure the (international) audience that Japan will not 
remilitarize, while the Japanese official tourism bureau and its foreign policy uses it towards 
international tourists (Japan is a nice, beautiful country with low crime rates). Of course, these 
actors themselves are also part of an identity, and this is something they cannot escape, but 
rational constructivism suggests that these political actors, often not necessarily one person 
but multiple people within the same discourse and the same institutional goal, can have a 
privileged position, which allows them to play a role in the (trans)formation of certain 
identities. This privileged position is derived from different aspects, and is being maintained 
actively by the agents in question. With the focus being also on the institutional goals of 
identity actors, it becomes clear that relational constructivism, unlike norm-constructivism, 
does not focus on how a policy came into existence, but why it came into existence. Which 
actors wanted that situation to be the case and why? How do they benefit from it? 
One of the most important parts of this construction of identity as a relation, is known 
generally as “othering”.90 By not only creating a dichotomy (us vs. them), but by actively 
attaching values and judgements to it (rational us vs. emotional them), identity entrepreneurs 
can create a discourse in which to make decisions and write policy based on those value 
judgements.
91
 An interesting example of this was also mentioned in Chapter 2. Traditionally, 
Zainichi Koreans in Japan were seen as notoriously unruly, rowdy, aggressive and even 
criminal. Within this framework it is argued that this is not solely because of their actions 
(which sometimes indeed were criminal and aggressive), but also because this is how the 
Japanese government wanted and needed them to be. As discussed in Chapter 2, Chōsen 
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Sōren used to be a part of the Japanese Communist Party, not even focussing solely on rights 
of Zainichi Koreans. It was no more defiant than Japanese communists, who were shunned 
but not institutionally excluded. Still, as the San Francisco Treaty was signed and Japan was 
all of a sudden left with a minority that it did not want to take care of, it was convenient for 
the Japanese government to ‘other’ the Zainichi Koreans into ‘peaceful us vs. criminal them’. 
This discourse meant that policies to exclude Zainichi from being able to claim benefits was 
somehow legitimated because they were not the productive, peaceful members of society that 
“normal” Japanese citizens were supposed to be. Of course, in this system, Self is always 
constructed positively against Other. Other is constructed for whatever purpose necessary. It 
does not necessarily mean negative, but most of the time it is constructed that way.  
This Self vs. Other can be widened in scope by broadening it to norm vs. exception. 
This relationship between norm and exception is exactly the relationship that has to be 
researched when looking at identities. Because relational implies communication, it is 
important to note that an actor will always try to legitimate its position, and thus to push it 
onto the Other, or to push the norm onto the exception. In IR this is called socialisation, and is 
defined as ‘the process by which states internalize norms originating elsewhere in the 
international system”.92 Of course, this does not only apply to states, but to any actor within 
the discourse. While Hagström finds that this definition focusses too much on the ‘norm’ and 
not enough on the ‘exception’ (for, as has been described above, there is no norm without 
exceptions)
93
, it does serve as a basis for an understanding on how the interaction between 
“self “and “other” takes place. If we keep in mind the importance of Other and exception, and 
how these concepts need each other, ‘socialisation’ is a term that fits within the relational 
constructivist framework. This ‘exceptionalism’ shows then how boundaries are constituted 
between different groups. Norms vs. Exception heavily implies that there is a difference 
between two groups, but that it is an ‘illegitimate’ difference: it does exist, but it should not. 
This is how tensions between groups are created and where issues arise. 
In order to see how these concepts of Self/Norms vs. Other/Exception are relationally 
constituted and how they interact with one another, Hagström looks at three processes: 
 “(1) socialisation operates through Self’s emulation of dominant norms – norms which 
fundamentally depend on prior exceptions; (2) exceptionalism operates through Self’s 
production of ‘legitimate’ differences vis-à-vis Others; and (3) securitisation operates 
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through Self’s attempt to protect itself from ‘illegitimate’ or ‘threatening’ 
differences.”94 
Now, I do not focus on securitization (the concept and international relations theory 
that threats and enemies are socially constructed to allow for certain behaviour or actions
95
), 
rather I want to focus on various actors’ legitimations and how their own constructed 
identities are the starting point of  policies and/actions. This is also the foundation of 
relational constructivism, as described in this chapter. For this reason, especially (1) and (2) 
are interesting to keep in mind for the present research. 
 
3.2.3 Identifying legitimation, legitimating identity 
As already reiterated in both sections, both the legitimation-relation and the identity-relation 
make use of some concepts that overlap (some more than others), like how boundaries are 
created and how legitimation is constructed. I argue that, while neither ever mentions drawing 
from the same authors or ever acknowledges one another, it becomes clear from their 
explanation that they are intertwined, and need each other to explain all the concepts and 
discourses they want to explain. 
 Combined, I can first use the identity-relational constructivism to determine the 
identities of the actors at hand and how they are constructed vis-à-vis a specific Other, which 
allows me to assess which discourses are dominant and which are only prevalent within 
certain institutions.  Understanding why these identities have been constructed and asserting 
the discourse then allows me to move on to the issue of legitimation. Having been able to 
assess the basis for understanding why certain legitimating rhetoric has been used, and 
knowing the social context, legitimation-relational constructivism will then aid me in 
explaining the different stances and policies of the Japanese government, and how it benefits 
from these policies in the dominant discourse.  
I would argue that, while identity-relational constructivism is useful on its own when 
looking solely at identities, it needs legitimation-relational constructivism to be able to 
properly assess policy-making. Because identity-relational constructivism argues that identity 
is not part of policy-making but part of policy itself, it loses an aspect within the policy-
making realm. Legitimation is an apt replacement, a rhetoric that helps the theory build a 
stronger case for itself. On the other hand, legitimation-relational constructivism does need 
identity-relational constructivism (or another theory) at its base, because this theory itself does 
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not provide a framework for how to define its actors and its social contexts, therefore missing 
a crucial point when it comes to the actual utilization of the theory. I believe that a 
combination of the two branches form a strong framework and an adequate base for the 
understanding of the issues coined in the present research. 
 
3.3 Using International Relations Theory for a Domestic issue, or is it? 
Of course, this theory is an international relations theory, and one could argue that, especially 
on a macro level, my research is one of domestic politics and society, not one of foreign 
relations. Campbell argued that foreign policy is “understood as referring to all relationships 
of otherness, practices of differentiation, or modes of exclusion that constitute their objects as 
foreign in the process of dealing with them.”96 Looking at this definition, especially keeping 
in mind the foundation of relational constructivism, it is safe to say that the basis of “Japanese 
government” vs. “Chōsen gakkō” as posited in my research, can be seen as a micro-form of 
such a “foreign” policy. 
 In addition to this, the way in which the Japanese government treats minorities in 
general, and the way in which it treats Zainichi Chōsenjin, are, as I have explained in Chapter 
2, fundamentally different. The way in which the Japanese government focuses on Zainichi 
Chōsenjin country of origin also justifies using an IR theory for this research. 
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Chapter 4. Methodology: Political Discourse Analysis 
In this chapter I will elaborate on the methodology I chose for my research, discourse analysis. 
This methodology has its roots in discourse theory, which will be briefly explained. Since my 
main objective is to use discourse analysis as a method, the theoretical part will not be 
discussed in depth, due to time and word constraints. First, however, I will explain my data 
set, why I chose it and what its limitations are. At the end of this chapter, I will revisit the data 
to show how it connects to this methodology, and how I will use it. 
 
4.1 Description of the Data 
The topic of North Koreans living in Japan is a controversial one, and for this research my 
access was restricted at a number of levels. This resulted in several hiccups in the continuity 
of my data, as well as the scope of it. During my fieldwork in Tokyo, I made the most of the 
access I had, but the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science, and Technology (MEXT), 
the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) as well as Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō 
were extremely reluctant, or downright unwilling to cooperate with my research. 
Consequently, my research is based on the materials that I could gather, and I recognize that 
these are not exhaustive or complete. However, since I did manage to draw from various 
sources, and speak to people in various positions, I am confident that I can draw conclusions 
from my data set. 
The data spans a time period from 2011 to 2017. The reason for this period is that the 
main clash between Chōsen gakkō and the Japanese government, namely the exclusion from 
the TWP, was started in 2011 by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).
97
 However, since the 
DPJ was voted out of power soon after they drafted this bill, the LDP under Abe Shinzo in 
2012 took it up to finish it. This means that, while the TWP was produced by the DPJ, and the 
DPJ initiated MEXT research into the local subsidies for Chōsen gakkō, this was not finalized 
until 2013, when Abe Shinzo was already prime minister. The MEXT research that was 
started in 2011 only concluded in 2013, Abe Shinzo enacted the plan of the DPJ in that year 
as well, and thus the scope of my data starts one year before Abe Shinzo came into power, 
instead of the – on the surface – more logical demarcation of 2012-2017.  
In the next section, I will explain the data I have for both the side of the Japanese 
government, as well as the side of Chōsen gakkō. 
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4.1.1 Data on the Japanese government 
 The data on the Japanese government can be separated into four institutions or 
branches, the Japanese Diet: MEXT, PSIA, and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG). 
These branches have been chosen both for relevance and for access. In the case of the 
Japanese Diet, I have used the transcriptions of the Diet Discussions when Chōsen gakkō was 
subject of discussion, regardless of in which committee it was brought up. From MEXT 
online archives I have used their 2011-2013 research of local subsidies for Chōsen gakkō, 
which included meeting minutes, interviews with high schools, voiced concerns over Chōsen 
gakkō and more. Because I was based in Tokyo, I decided to localize my research and to use a 
research project from the TMG from 2013, when the TMG decided whether or not it was 
willing to subsidize Chōsen gakkō. PSIA, which is a government organ established to conduct 
information collection on ‘subversive organisations’ (not further specified) and (terrorist) 
organisations that have committed mass murder,
98
 provided me with its yearly reports on 
security situations both domestically and internationally, but was unfortunately unwilling to 
answer any questions I had about its reports. Nonetheless, it offers a security perspective from 
the government for my research. Finally, I attended several seminars organized for the 
Cabinet or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These seminars focused on North Korea, hence 
not necessarily on Chōsen gakkō, but they provided me with much useful background 
information. 
 
4.1.2 Data on the Chōsen community 
The focus of this research is on the Japanese government; however, in order to adequately 
assess the identity of Chōsen gakkō, so as to position it in contrast to the Japanese government, 
it is necessary to take this into account as well. However, the Chōsen community is incredibly 
closed off, and finding information was therefore extremely difficult. The data on Chōsen 
gakkō can be split into four categories: Chōsen Sōren, the NGO Human Rights for Koreans in 
Japan (HURAK), Chōsen University and its alumni. The data that was easiest accessible was 
the Chōsen Sōren website, which has different sections on Chōsen gakkō. Since Chōsen Sōren 
remains the overarching organization, its take on Chōsen gakkō is invaluable when assessing 
its identity. HURAK is an organization with ties to Chōsen Sōren, which advocates for (as the 
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name suggests) equal rights for Koreans in Japan. It focusses on the subsidy issue and on 
discrimination in general, and has published reports that I was able to obtain. The Korean 
University, or Chōsen Daigakkō, held its 60th anniversary festival during my time in Tokyo, 
which made it possible for me to visit the campus. Later, I was able to do a tour of the 
premises, and listened to presentations given by students. Unfortunately, we were allowed to 
talk to the students for only three minutes before being escorted out by personnel, so there 
was no opportunity to ask them questions. The presentations, however, were highly 
informative and will be used as data. Again, I cannot stress enough how secluded the Chōsen 
community is, hence speaking to students was impossible. I did manage, however, to 
interview a very select group of alumni of Chōsen gakkō. These interviews, although sparse, 
will be used as anecdotal evidence, and are thus useful, as they add another dimension to the 
data. The interviews are anonymized to protect the interviewees from any kind of negativity at 
home or from the organizations they are part of. The full interviews in Japanese (and one in 
English) can be read in the Appendix of this thesis. Finally, while not part of separately 
collected data, the responses of Chōsen gakkō in the MEXT and TMG research are also 
sources of data that I used. 
  
4.2. Political Discourse Analysis: Discourse Theory 
The foundation of discourse and discourse theory lie with Michel Foucault who used the 
phrase “discourse” to describe and research how knowledge and its power relations are 
ordered.
99
 In this setting, a discourse is thus an “ordering” of how we understand our reality, 
and it becomes clear immediately that it has to do with power relations, something that is 
always prevalent when discussing politics. Therefore, this approach has been popular with 
political scientists. However, since Foucault’s work, many other scholars have defined and 
redefined discourse, from the simple definition that discourse is “anything written or said 
or communicated using signs”100  to, for instance, “coherent claims of propositions which 
establish a ‘discourse’ world or ‘discourse ontology’”.101 With this evolution of the definition 
came also an evolution of the elements that a discourse could encompass. While critical 
discourse analysis for instance relies heavily on written or spoken text for analysis, in recent 
years discourse analysis of visual material or a combination of different materials have also 
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come into existence.
102
 Since my material does not involve any visual material, I will heavily 
draw on critical discourse analysis as Fairclough has expanded on. In his view discourse is the 
“use of language seen as a form of social practice, and discourse analysis is analysis of how 
texts work within sociocultural practice”.103  This already shows a reliance on language more 
than in the other definitions that were given, which also hints at the part that will be discussed 
below, namely that not only the message of a text should be interpreted, but also the way a 
text was written (semantics and syntax), by whom, and for whom.
104
 In fact, later in his book, 
Fairclough extends his definition  of discourse, and divides it into three points, “1. a language 
text […]; 2. text production and […] interpretation and; 3. sociocultural practice.”105 
 These interpretable texts, however, cannot make up a discourse on their own. They 
interact with other texts, refer to each other, are created by the same author, or refer to similar 
events in the past or present. This kind of text interaction which keeps a discussion or 
argument in society running or alive is called ‘intertextuality’.106 As Fairclough states “[it] 
shows where the text is located with respect to the social network of orders of discourse – 
how a text actualizes and extends the potential within orders of discourse.”107 
Using these definitions, analysing a discourse can show what, at a certain point in time, 
is the commonplace reaction to a certain event or action that one is researching. This is done 
not only by taking what is being said or written at face value, but also by analysing the kind of 
speech that is uttered and showing the emotions or the values that certain words or phrasing 
elicit. In this sense, a discourse also shows representations of people, organizations or 
governments, and thus can also show which representations are dominant and which are 
marginalized.
108
 With this theory in mind, the data that I have gathered will be used to analyse 
the discourse of the Japanese government regarding Chōsen gakkō and vice versa. Finally, 
important to note is that a discourse analysis does not tell anything about people’s thoughts, it 
only shows the dominant course of action.
109
 The following section will explain how this 
definition and theory are then utilized specifically for political discourse analysis. 
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4.2.1 Political Discourse Theory  
When specifying a discourse analysis as a political discourse analysis, the method remains the 
same, but theoretically, there are a few aspects to keep in mind, that also connect to the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 3. Specifically, I draw on the findings of Chilton and 
Fairclough, who write either on political discourse analysis (Chilton) or on opposition and 
struggle shown through discourse analysis (Fairclough).  
 Chilton discusses legitimation as part of a political discourse, specifically how a 
discourse tries to legitimize and de-legitimize certain actors or actions.
110
 This too shows that 
discourse analysis as a method fits well within my project, because the question of 
legitimation is one of the key components of the present research. Chilton sees legitimation as 
a process of representation, and the promotion of representation. He argues that “a pervasive 
feature of representation is the evident need for political speakers to imbue their utterances 
with evidence, authority and truth, a process that we shall refer to […] as legitimation.”111 
This legitimation can exist in two forms, epistemological legitimation, and deontic 
legitimation. An actor or a text can claim either one, or both. When a statement claims 
epistemological legitimation, it makes claims about objective knowledge (for instance using 
scientific research to legitimize policy on climate change). When a statement claims deontic 
legitimation, it plays on moral legitimation: it is the ‘right’ thing to do. It tries to stimulate 
emotions of fear, anger or loyalty within the audience and to present the actor as a moral 
authority sharing common moral ground with the audience.
112
 A handy tool that Chilton coins 
are four ‘strategic functions of expression’, of which two are the concepts mentioned above, 
(de)legitimation and (mis)representation.
113
 These two are also the ones relevant for my 
research, so I will discuss these techniques a bit more in depth.  
 Depending on the audience the text is meant for, legitimation techniques can include: 
stating ideological principles (e.g. Japan is a harmonious country), arguments regarding voter 
wants and needs (mostly playing on emotions), and self-glorification like positive 
representation, charismatic leadership projection and performance boasting.
114
 Another 
important technique is claiming rationality and reasonableness.
115
 Again in line with the 
theory that is being used, these kinds of techniques also presuppose an ‘other’ that can be put 
down using these techniques. To delegitimize an ‘other’, a text can incorporate ways of 
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presenting the ‘other’ negatively, such as presenting ideas of different ideology or boundaries, 
attacking morality and rationality, excluding the ‘other’ from the narrative all together, and 
scapegoating.  Techniques of representation are shorter and simpler: basically, an actor can 
omit parts of the truth to increase positive representation, and the other way around.
116
 These 
techniques are handy when executing a discourse analysis, because they give a clear 
indication of what to look for when trying to assess identity and legitimation within a corpus 
of data. 
According to Fairclough, within a discourse there is always strife and opposition.
117
 
From what I have previously discussed, this seems logical, as there is no dominant discourse 
without weaker discourses that have to give way. However, when discussing legitimation and 
how actors legitimate themselves, it is important to realize that, in order for the struggle and 
opposition to actively resist a certain discourse, it needs to have a dominant position within 
another discourse. As Fairclough summarizes, “Resistance is most likely to come from 
subjects whose positioning within other institutions and orders of discourse provides them 
with the resources to resist”. 118  These resources can be either support, legitimation, or 
physical aid. Fairclough’s theory makes it easier to assess Chōsen gakkō as an ‘other’, and to 
determine if and how it resists the Japanese government. 
 
4.2.2 (Qualitative) Discourse Analysis 
As discourse theory has already shown, in order to conduct a discourse analysis, one of the 
foremost things is that one has to establish the context in which the texts were created and to 
research by and for whom these texts were created, which goes hand in hand with one of the 
major pitfalls. One of the pitfalls of a discourse analysis, according to Fairclough, is that 
sometimes the data used is not put into a historical context, or at least not enough.
119
 In order 
to jump this hurdle, I have tried to make sure that Chapter 2 not only shows the gap in the 
literature, but also the several historical aspects of the issue that this thesis deals with.  
 When examining the data and collecting discursive or interesting statements, I have 
specifically looked at emotive expressions that are being used to describe the issue at hand, or 
how a term such as Chōsen gakkō is linked (explicitly or implicitly) to a different issue. I have 
also focused on what rhetoric is used to justify a claim (on both sides) and how certain issues 
or people are in- or excluded from a certain viewpoint. While I have not focused on every 
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linguistic aspect because of time constraints, I have, as Schneider suggests, “identif[ied] 
linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms”120 used by the producers of certain texts. Because of the 
nature of my research, I have (as described by both the theory and the methodology) looked at 
expressions of (de)legitimation, and (mis)representation on both sides of the spectrum. As 
Mautner writes on how to conduct a discourse analysis, I have also noted what she calls 
modality, for instance, expressions of certainty versus expressions of vagueness.
121
 When 
interpreting the data, Schneider states that one of the most important things to keep in mind is 
“who benefits from the discourse?”122 Seeing as that is the research question for this thesis, it 
proves that this methodology will help solve the problem at hand. 
Because of the lack of access to data, it is not possible to conduct a quantitative 
discourse analysis. In addition, I am working with varied materials that all require researching 
them differently, because they are produced by different bodies, people or organizations as 
opposed to, for instance, news articles about a subject from a single newspaper. For this 
reason, I have opted to work with a qualitative discourse analysis. I have selected materials 
that focus specifically on Chōsen gakkō, by relevant bodies of government, or by the Chōsen 
community itself, as described above. According to Schneider, this kind of demarcation is one 
of the most important parts when doing a qualitative discourse analysis.
123
 Reisigl too states, 
“select a small but relevant corpus, analyse it, and on the basis of your findings, check again 
[…] narrow down the texts to interests, access and scope.”124 This will still yield the key 
points of the message that I am looking for. In addition to this, Chilton also states that, when 
researching discourse and legitimation, it yields results to focus on the pragmatic 
interpretation of texts
125
, and not dive too deeply into the syntax of a language. 
This decision also accounts for the fact that my research thus does not include a corpus 
of analysed text, namely because I did not use a quantitative method of looking at the text.  
 
4.3 A Note on my Research Data and a note on the Japanese language 
Drawing on the literature of discourse analysis, there are a couple of aspects I want to discuss 
about my data before the actual discourse analysis. Regarding the Japanese government, I 
focus on different branches of government, who in the end always have to answer to the 
Cabinet. This means that the audience for the MEXT and PSIA reports are first and foremost 
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the Cabinet, and only then the general public. The Diet discussions are available for the public 
to read, but the discussions at the time are mainly to convince party or opposition members. 
This does show the internal struggle of the Japanese government, but also the road it wants to 
take collectively, which is more clearly shown to the general public. As for the data on the 
Chōsen community, Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō official statements and presentations are 
both for its followers and the general public; the same applies to reports by HURAK. 
HURAK’s added value is that it also writes specifically to several bodies of the UN, thus 
creating a much wider audience. The different kinds of impact that the different data have, are 
important to keep in mind. 
All my sources are Japanese language sources, save for one of the interviews and 
several HURAK reports to the UN, which are in English. The emphasis on Japanese language 
was not only necessary because of the lack of English language sources, but also because 
discourse analysis calls for texts in the original language. Both Neumann and Schneider 
emphasise the fact that cultural understanding of an issue is key,
126
 and of course this also 
includes the language of an issue. Schneider, on his website, addresses how to process foreign 
language sources such as Japanese, and how to transfer the results to an English text. He 
discusses several varied methods on how to write down the translations and the original text. 
One of them focusses on the readability of the English text, even if it means that the Japanese 
original text is not translated literally. This causes a loss of syntax, but the semantics will 
remain the same.
127
 Because my research does not focus on syntax, I have opted for this 
approach. Whenever I quote from my sources, I will use both my English translation and the 
Romanized Japanese original text. This way, the analysis is understandable for readers 
unfamiliar with the Japanese language, but those who do know Japanese can check the 
original and how it was written. 
 
4.4 Implementing Theory and Method 
For the purpose of my thesis, ‘Self versus Other’ will be ‘branches of Japanese government’ 
vs. ‘Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō’. This means that on the side of the Japanese 
government, I will look at Diet Discussions from the Abe Cabinet, MEXT documents, PSIA 
documents and TMG documents. On the side of Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō, I will look 
at statements and presentations by Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō, and documents from 
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HURAK, which lobbies for Chōsen Sōren. The reason for separating my actors is that I want 
to show how different actors within the discourse try to mould the issue to their benefit. As 
will be shown in Chapter 6, while the Japanese government has one official position on 
Chōsen gakkō, there are multiple bodies within the government that busy themselves with this 
issue, and it is important to investigate how each individually looks at this issue. The same is 
true for the other side. While Chōsen gakkō is the topic of my research, Chōsen Sōren behind 
it cannot be ignored, even more so because the Japanese government, as I will show, does 
take Chōsen Sōren into account. The HURAK is also important, because it works closely with 
Chōsen Sōren on the issue of Chōsen gakkō, and has Chōsen Sōren members working for it, 
thus actively connecting Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō. 
Together with the literature review in Chapter 2, my data analysis will show what the 
dominant discourse is regarding Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren, and what kind of rhetoric 
various branches of the Japanese government have used for legitimizing their positions on 
Chōsen gakkō. However, when assessing who benefits from the current situation, I cannot 
treat Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren as passive objects. Therefore, in Chapter 5 I will show 
also how Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren and its members identify themselves, and how this 
differs from how the Japanese government has categorised them. Putting them both in the 
framework of ‘us vs. them’ will also allow me to extract the identities each actor has given 
itself in relation to the other. The actions undertaken by various actors on the side of the 
Chōsen community is paramount for understanding how they legitimate their positions in 
opposition of each other, and who benefits from the current state of affairs.  
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Chapter 5. Analysis: Chōsen gakkō vs. the Japanese Government 
Using a qualitative discourse analysis, I will analyse my source material as described in 
Chapter 4. First, I will discuss how the agents within the sphere of Zainichi Chōsenjin portray 
their discourse, and in Chapter 6 I will do the same for the agents of the Japanese government. 
Chapter 5 will consist of sections that elaborate on specific themes that are prominent within 
the Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren discourse. 
This chapter will be relatively short compared to Chapter 6. The focus of my project is 
to identify claims the Japanese government makes with regard to Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen 
gakkō. However, Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō are not simply passive objects upon which 
government agencies can project their preferred identities. In addition, reflecting on how 
Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō view themselves is also of importance, because it can be 
juxtaposed with how the Japanese government views them, thus giving more insight in how 
this issue is being treated. 
 
5.1 Minority Rights and Discrimination 
From the side of the Zainichi Chōsenjin, the main focus lies on minority rights and 
discrimination. The foremost topic within this theme is the lack of subsidies, both from the 
Japanese government and from the local governments. During presentations given by students 
of the Chōsen University, the topic that they most discussed was the fact that the highschools 
were excluded from the TWP, and that students, parents and others were protesting in front of 
MEXT almost every Friday to fight for their rights and their subsidy.
128
 Interestingly, Chōsen 
Sōren is not mentioned in the presentation on Chōsen gakkō discrimination. Similarly, in a 
pamphlet made for the celebration of the 60
th
 anniversary of the Chōsen University, 
describing its history, the Japanese government’s discrimination is discussed, but not Chōsen 
Sōren’s involvement in the matter.129 The lack of attention to Chōsen Sōren is something that 
is important to keep in mind both in this Chapter, and in Chapter 6. 
 HURAK reiterates the point of financial discrimination, stating that students who 
attend Chōsen gakkō are not only discriminated against because of the tuition waiver 
programme and the halt of local subsidies, but also because of their schools’ lack of 
accreditation as a formal school, and the unequal treatment when it comes to applying for 
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higher education.
130
 HURAK also condemns the Japanese government’s “discriminatory 
measures against Korean residents in Japan.”131 It also mentions the history of Chōsen gakkō, 
and how the Japanese government in the 1940’s “suppressed those schools by military 
power” 132 , thus further emphasizing the discrimination and violence against Zainichi 
Chōsenjin. This is where we can see a discourse of resistance emerging. Chōsen gakkō and 
HURAK, both part of a marginalized group, resist the government’s discourse by trying to 
use the same techniques of de-legitimating the stance of the Japanese government by 
portraying it in a negative way. 
Chōsen Sōren on its official website also makes a hard case for the subsidies for 
Korean schools, condemning the Japanese government for its behaviour of discriminating 
against Korean children (“Nihon tōkyoku wa, zainichichōsenjin shijo no minzoku kyōiku no 
kenri o mitomezu, kyōiku josei ya shikaku shutoku nado ni oite, sabetsu-teki seisaku o jisshi 
shite kita.”)133 At the same time, Chōsen Sōren also takes the opportunity to assert how hard it 
has been working for the Koreans in Japan. For example, on the same page, it states that 
Chōsen Sōren “has been campaigning for the rights of their fellow countrymen” (dōhō shijo 
ga tōzen kyōyū subeki kenri o kakutoku suru tame, nebaridzuyoku undō o kurihirogete kita)134 
and “Chōsen Sōren […] is burning with determination to protect ethnic education” (Sōren 
[…] ha, minzoku kyōiku o shikkari to mamori, hikitsudzuki hatten sa seru ketsui ni moete iru 
so no kekka, kenri kakutoku ni oite mezamashī zenshin ga motarasa reta).135 Perhaps the most 
clear example of Chōsen Sōren reaffirming its position as the saviour of the Zainchi 
Chōsenjin is that, after discussing all that Chōsen Sōren has done for Chōsen gakkō, it states 
“Sono kekka, […] mezamashī zenshin ga motarasa reta.” (“As a result, remarkable progress 
has been made”).136 When discussing the history of Chōsen gakkō, Chōsen Sōren again puts 
itself on the foreground, stating how Chōsen Sōren has been paramount in protecting the 
schools against the Japanese and American forces (“Amerika to Nihon tōkyoku”) in the 1950s, 
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and how under Sōren leadership the Koreans have gained more rights than they had before.137 
In this case, the discourse techniques used are boasting about performance and positive self-
representation. Chōsen Sōren focuses on how it has always taken care of the community, and 
how their efforts have made the pay-off ‘remarkable’. This implies heavily that there would 
have been less progress had Chōsen Sōren not protected the schools. 
Both Chōsen Sōren138 and HURAK139 also focus specifically on the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), Committee Elimination Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). From as early as 1998 (UNHRC) to 2014 (CERD), all of these UN 
bodies have published reports wherein they urge the Japanese government to uphold their 
conventions and cease the discrimination against Korean schools (including Korean schools in 
the TWP). They have also urged the government to act against the violence committed against 
Koreans in Japan.
140
 
From these examples we can see that the feeling of discrimination and the fight for 
minority rights is prominent, but also that the Japanese government is seen as the principal 
enemy. The fact that the Chōsen community uses the UN conventions to show their rights in 
an international sphere does not only show how they are trying to assert their international 
legitimacy, but also that the Japanese government is an even bigger bogeyman: not only for 
discriminating against Chōsenjin, but also for not adhering to international standards.  
The discrimination against Chōsen gakkō is palpable on more levels. The interviews 
that I conducted reiterate this viewpoint. Ms E, someone who works closely with HURAK in 
Tokyo, stated in passing that her job in Tokyo had become so difficult since Tokyo Governor 
Yuriko Koike came to office, since Koike hates Koreans. Ms Y, mother of two children 
attending Chōsen gakkō, recalled how her children were called names, and how peers would 
say, “Go back to Korea”. Ms E told me, “I felt discriminated. Whenever I was going to school 
in Chima chogori [traditional Korean school uniform], I would feel people who I think were 
Japanese stare at me with hostility” (Kanjita. Chima chogori de tsūgaku shite iru toki ni, 
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nihonjin to omowa reru hito kara tekii o kometa me de nirama reta koto o oboete iru).
141
 Ms 
B and Ms C remembered having the same experience when it comes to wearing Chima 
chogori.
142
 Mr F remembered feeling discriminated against because of the lack of subsidies, 
but also because on the walls on one of the schools he attended, someone had written, “Die 
stupid Koreans” (“Gakkō chikaku no gādorēru ni `Chōsen baka shine' to kaka reta koto ga 
arimashita. Mata, Chōsengakkō ni wa hojokintō ga shikyū sa rete inai koto mo, sabetsuda to 
kanjimashita.”)143 Ms C, a former Japanese teacher at a Korean highschool also mentioned the 
subsidies, but also the shouting at students, and students reading hateful messages about them 
on the internet. She added that, as Korean schools do not have student counsellors, the 
teachers try to address this together with the children.
144
 This sentiment is also reiterated by 
the Chōsen gakkō community in a response to the TMG research. It stated there that it did not 
want the TMG research to be in the media, because they were afraid that the schools and the 
children would be slandered or threatened.
145
 Again, by portraying the (local) government as 
the ‘evil’ other versus the ‘suppressed’ self, the Chōsen community tries to gain sympathy for 
its cause, using a technique of shared beliefs and (international) values that everyone deserves 
the same rights and should not be discriminated. Here, it heavily draws on deontic 
legitimation. 
 
5.2. Identity and Assimilation: Do Zainichi Chōsenjin belong to “All Japan”? 
Adjacent to the issue of discrimination by the Japanese government and the public, another 
important theme is the formation of identity. When I asked the interviewees what they felt 
they gained from their Korean education, and whether (and why) they would send their 
children to Korean schools, all of them mentioned cultivating a Korean ethnic identity as one 
of the reasons.  
Ms B for instance said she was happy that she learned about her roots (ru-tsu) and 
wanted her children to learn the same.
146
 Ms C stated that she never wanted to be a teacher, 
but the Korean school lacked teachers, and she wanted to give back to the community. 
Nonetheless, she wanted to “express and teach my Korean identity in Japan through Japanese 
[the subject she teaches].” (Nihongo o tōshite, kono Nihon de Chōsen hito to shite ikiru jibun 
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o kōtei shi, hyōgen suru kotodakaradesu.)147 Ms E felt that most of all she gained an “ethnic 
identity, a strong connection with the community and a strong belief in having to protect the 
Korean society in Japan” (Minzoku-teki aidentiti, ningen dōshi no tsuyoi tsunagari, 
zainichichōsenjin shakai o mamotte ikou to iu tsuyoi shin'nen).148 Ms A responded that she 
felt that it was better for Koreans in Japan to go to a Korean school within the community, 
because she gained knowledge of Korean history and language, and made Korean friends. 
Additionally, she mentioned that at the Korean schools, they learned different aspects of 
Japanese politics.
149
 Mr F, too, felt that he was able to learn about history, culture and 
language in a way that would not have been possible in a Japanese school.
150
 
These anecdotes show that the most important thing for the respondents is cultivating 
an ethnic identity. Ms C, Ms D, Ms E and Ms A all explicitly stated that they felt they or their 
children were better off within the Korean community, and that they should not steer away 
from that. This shows how important it is for Koreans to be able to ground somewhere they 
feel understood and safe. Additionally, in the TMG report Chōsen gakkō responds to TMG 
that they want to teach the students dignity, and coexistence with the Japanese people from 
their position as a minority.
151
 This point is even conceded by some government actors. In the 
MEXT reports, emphasis is also put on the fact that the schools want to focus on Korean 
history and language from a Korean point of view in order to create a Korean identity, not 
turn them into North Korean pawns. For this reason, Chōsen gakkō has also decided not to 
hang any Kim Jong Un portraits on the wall, and self-criticism sessions have long been 
removed from the curriculum.
152
 These actions show that for the Zainichi Chōsen community, 
the Korean identity formation is not about a political identity, but about an ethnic identity as a 
minority in Japan. 
In contrast, while Chōsen Sōren also argues that ethnic education is important, it puts 
the emphasis on totally different aspects. Where we can see with Chōsen gakkō that the 
emphasis is on preserving Korean aspects of topics and cultivating a Zainichi Korean identity 
with (pre-)North Korea as a point of reference, Chōsen Sōren focusses much more on North 
Korea, on their website frequently referring to it as ‘sokoku’ or ‘motherland’. For instance, 
when discussing the history of Chōsen education on its website, Chōsen Sōren states: “Under 
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the warm concern of the motherland and the wise leadership of the respectable leader Kim Il 
Sung, [Chōsen Sōren] has overcome many difficulties while developing ethnic education.” 
(Keiai suru kimu iruson shuseki no kenmeina shidō to sokoku no atatakai hairyo no moto, 
ikuta no kon'nan o norikoenagara minzoku kyōiku jigyō o hatten sa sete kita). 153  It 
furthermore raises the question about how Koreans in Japan live their lives, also creating a 
large role for ethnic education in identity formation. But unlike the statements by Chōsen 
gakkō and the interviewees, Chōsen Sōren distinguishes between two choices: Children can 
live as a “true Korean”(shin no Chōsenjin), or they can live as a Japanese person, know 
nothing about their ethnicity and “assimilate” (dōka).154 This is a strong normative statement, 
because it implies that anyone not joining Chōsen gakkō knows nothing about themselves and 
is therefore not a “true Korean”, and will assimilate, implying that they will lose their identity 
and pretend to be Japanese. 
Chōsen Sōren adds to this that “ethnic education is important, because the younger 
generation, born and raised in Japan, do not know the words and alphabet of “our own 
country” (jibun no kuni), nor their “motherland and home town” (sokoku to furusato).155 It 
also emphasizes the uniqueness of the Korean population in Japan, stating that there is no 
other movement but the community of the “Zainichi brethren” (Zainichi dōhō) that has 
“generations that are on soil of a foreign country and have been separated from the 
motherland” (Sokoku o hanareta ikoku no ji de sedai), protecting ethnic education.156 
From the link between Kim Il-Sung and ‘motherland’ earlier in its writings, it is clear 
that, in this case, ‘motherland’ does not mean the former unified Korea or the idea of a unified 
Korea, but specifically the Korea under the rule of the Kim family, i.e. the DPRK. This kind 
of language is stronger connected to the DPRK than the language Chōsen gakkō and the 
interviewees use when describing their ethnic identity, thus turning it more into a political 
identity.  
Both Chōsen gakkō in the TMG files as well as the interviewees talk about ethnic 
education and ethnic identity, only Chōsen Sōren talks about the fatherland and being good 
brethren. We can also see within the MEXT and TMG reports that Chōsen gakkō definitely 
has made an effort to replace the parts that the government did not agree with, such as certain 
depictions of events and descriptions of people, with different material. In fact, already in 
2003, the curriculum has had a major overhaul to take into account ‘21st century Koreans’ 
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whose life is in Japan.
157
 Because of this, it seems that Chōsen gakkō recognizes that some of 
the content can be removed while still teaching ethnic education (emphasizing again and 
again to both the TMG and MEXT that the textbooks are not made by Chōsen Sōren158, and 
that the schools are not run by board members of Chōsen Sōren159). This is a much more 
nuanced stance than HURAK and Chōsen Sōren take. As seen in the previous Section, 
Chōsen Sōren does not seem to play a large role in Chōsen gakkō’s own narrative. 
Nevertheless, it becomes clear that the people involved with Chōsen gakkō do not feel 
Japanese, and do not want to be seen as Japanese. They want to have their own identity, 
which is something that they feel comfortable with in a society that discriminates, and create a 
safe space for them and their children. At the same time, Chōsen gakkō recognizes the gap 
between the previous generations and the current generation and tries to cater to the current 
state of affairs.  
 
5.3 What does this tell us about Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren?  
While Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō partly face the same issues because of Chōsen 
Sōren’s part in setting up the schools and its close ties with HURAK, it is clear that in the 
current time and environment, Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren are not synonymous. They 
spring from the same origin, but Chōsen gakkō has tried to evolve together with the students 
and Japanese society, trying to battle the discrimination against the schools as well as to cater 
to the expectations of MEXT and TMG. The interviewees reiterate that the most important 
thing about Chōsen gakkō is the possibility to learn about their own background, and to feel 
proud about who they are in an environment that does not agree with them. They want to be 
Korean, but they specifically want to be Korean in Japan. This coincides with what has been 
discussed Chapter 2 about the place of Zainichi Koreans in Japanese society in.  
 However, Chōsen Sōren is the most radical in its opinions, making references to being 
“true Koreans” and “the fatherland”. Chōsen gakkō does not seem to be colluding with this 
discourse, as those references are non-existent in texts by Chōsen gakkō, and Chōsen Sōren 
hardly gets any mention when discussing the schools and their issues. In addition to that, not 
all Koreans who go to a Chosen gakkō are (still) members of Chōsen Sōren, as also reiterated 
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by the interviewees, of which both Ms A and Ms C stated that they are not members of 
Chōsen Sōren. However, because HURAK is such a paramount part of the fight against 
discrimination, Chōsen Sōren still has some fingers in some pies, and we can see that Chōsen 
Sōren takes up the discrimination not only as a problem that needs to be solved, but also as a 
handle to try and secure its position as the leader of the Zainichi Chōsenjin, by mentioning 
time and again how it has always protected and catered for them. It thus also makes great use 
of the fact that many UN committees actually often have recommended to the Japanese 
government to change its policy. Just like the Japanese government, as we will see in Chapter 
6, Chōsen Sōren finds that the “international community” is on its side, thus drawing extra 
legitimacy from it. 
 Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō, then, on a discursive level are not as similar as many 
people, think. This is something that is very important, as the perceived identity of an entity 
determines how others interact with it. The difference in identity also makes for a difference 
in reaction. Even if Chōsen Sōren would really be in control of Chōsen gakkō, it is the 
discourse of Chōsen gakkō that really matters so the parents and alumni, as becomes evident 
from my interviews and the student presentations. They feel that Chōsen gakkō helps them 
establish an ethnic identity, not a political identity; and it is an ethnic identity that they wish to 
cultivate.   
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Chapter 6. The Japanese government vs. Chōsen gakkō 
 
6.1 The Japanese government’s stance 
This chapter, much like Chapter 5, will be divided into several themes that I found to be 
prominent in the Japanese government’s discourse. Within each of these themes, I will draw 
from the different sources from the various branches of the Japanese government that I have 
investigated. At the end of this chapter, I will compare the discourses of the Japanese 
government with those of Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren. 
 It should be noted how little attention the issue of North Korean education in Japan 
has received in the Japanese Diet. Considering that this is a high-profile issue that has been 
covered by the media, and the fact that many Korean highschools have been suing their local 
governments for subsidies, one would expect that this would get more attention. Chōsen 
Sōren and all its branches and facets, on the other hand, are a regular discussion point within 
the Diet. Only in 2016 and 2017 did Chōsen gakkō receive significant attention in the Diet, 
mostly so in the Special Committee for the North Korean Abduction Issue. This coincides 
with recent DPRK aggression and heightened tensions within the East-Asia region, namely 
the missile and nuclear tests that have been conducted in 2016 and 2017 as described in the 
introduction. It also coincides with growing Chōsen gakkō support. Even more so since in 
August 2017 for the first time a court ruled that Chōsen should, in fact, receive subsidies. In 
contrast to the Diet, PSIA reports have had columns on Chōsen gakkō in almost all of their 
annual reports since 2011. While this already shows that for the Japanese government this is 
much more important as a security issue than as a societal or human rights issue, it also 
implies, as I will elaborate below, that the Japanese Diet does not want to take responsibility 
for this issue. There could be many reasons why they want to evade responsibility, but one of 
them could be that, while the government sorely disagrees with Chōsen gakkō’s existence (as 
will be discussed in 6.1.4), it actually does not have the legal mechanisms to make significant 
changes. The Court ruling in August 2017 emphasizes that, within the confines of Japanese 
law, Chōsen gakkō can be successful. Moreover, as the case was only restricted to the issue of 
subsidy policy, there might be even greater scope for legal cases against even harsher 
governmental measures focused on Chōsen gakkō, should they be implemented.  
Thus, this analysis sets out to show how various branches of the Japanese government 
use the situation at hand to create an identity in opposition to Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō, 
and how they use it to legitimate their own agenda. These themes examine the discourse of 
both the Japanese government as a whole, and of the several branches involved. 
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6.1 Education 
Education is the first issue I want to touch upon because it is the main purpose of Chōsen 
gakkō and the Chōsen University. Yet conspicuous by its absence is criticism by the Japanese 
government of the actual education programs. In all of the documents I have analysed, very 
little mention was made of the educational content that highschools and university provide. 
When I started this research, I had expected that part of the reason why Chōsen gakkō were so 
contested, and were classified as “miscellaneous schools”, was the quality of their teaching 
subjects. If students of Chōsen gakkō were not eligible for Japanese universities without doing 
additional exams on top of the regular entrance exams, then surely their knowledge must be 
deemed inadequate. If my assumption would be correct, the documents do not show it. The 
only time that the content of Chōsen gakkō teaching is mentioned in a negative way is when 
prime minister Abe, during a Finance Committee meeting, answers a concerned opposition 
member (who worries about the school buildings standing on state-owned land), stating that 
measures have been taken on prefectural level, and that it is true that there are various 
problem with the content of Chōsen education (“kyōiku naiyō ni samazamana mondai ga atta 
koto mo jijitsu de arō”).160  Which “various problems” there are with the content is not 
mentioned by Abe, and not mentioned or asked about by the opposition. This makes it seem 
as if it is just a phrase used to express disdain for Chōsen gakkō in general.  
In contrast, the few times that the Chōsen curriculum is mentioned (apart from the 
ideology classes or nursery rhymes that will be discussed in section 6.1.3), are when MEXT 
praises the Chōsen classes they have seen during their research (“Seito ni taishite, jibun de 
kangaeru koto no jūyō-sei o sakan ni uttaete ita koto ga inshōbukai.”) It is deeply impressive 
that the students were enthusiastically using the importance of thinking for themselves; 
“According to the results of the fieldwork, there does not seem to be any concern about the 
students in class.” (“Jitchi chōsa no kekkade wa, jugyō ni okeru seito no yōsu nado tokuni 
kenen sa reru tokoro wa miataranakatta yōda[…]”).161 This praise is strengthened by the 
words “deeply” and “enthusiastically”, putting the focus on the ‘quality’ of the students. This 
is interesting praise for students of a school that is time and again accused by the Japanese 
government and media of indoctrinating its students with DPRK propaganda.  
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  Similarly, in the research conducted by the TMG there is very little attention for 
subjects other than the nursery rhymes about Kim Il-Sung and other Kim-related matters. In 
fact, at the start of its report it states that most of the curriculum is the same as that for 
Japanese schools, with the exception of history, society and music.
162
 This is not to say that 
the fixation on the Kim dynasty is not odd or disconcerting, but when looking at how the 
curriculum of the schools is scrutinized, and what kind of impact this has on the students (still 
having difficulty entering Japanese universities), it seems a bit out of proportion. This seems 
especially relevant when MEXT concludes in its report that there does not seem to be unjust 
control over Chōsen gakkō by Chōsen Sōren (Chōsen gakkō have their own managers, 
separate from the Sōren managers), “but we should continue investigating just in case” 
(“Ippan-ron to shite wa, aru dantai ga kyōiku ni taishite eikyō o oyoboshite iru koto nomi o 
motte, tadachini `futōna shihai'(kyōiku kihon-hō dai 16-jō) ga aru to wa ienaiga,`futōna 
shihai' ni ataru ka dō ka hikitsudzuki kentō suru hitsuyō ga aru tame”).163 
In conclusion, actual discussion about the Chōsen gakkō curriculum and how it 
connects with, for instance, Japanese universities excels by its absence. This implies more 
evidence that the Chōsen gakkō issue is not about education. It is not about whether the 
schools are academically adequate enough to teach a portion of Japanese citizens, and/or 
whether they fit in in Japanese society. The prominent issue is security. 
  
6.1.2. Security: Nukes, Missiles and Schools 
In the government data on Chōsen gakkō, the issue that is mentioned most is the abduction 
issue. A close second is the missile and nuclear tests. The fact that these topics are the ones 
most frequently voiced when discussing ethnic education sets the premise for the second 
theme I want to discuss: Chōsen gakkō framed as a (international) security issue.  
During a meeting of the Special Committee for the North Korean Abduction Issue, 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) member Saito Hiroaki
164
 mentioned that he believes there are 
various problems with the financial assistance to Chōsen gakkō that the government should 
“absolutely” deal with “firmly” (“Zehi seifu kara kono mondai ni shikkari torikunde itadakitai 
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to omotte orimasu”).165 During the same meeting, one committee member, Matsubara Jin 
(DPJ member), argued that the fact that local governments could decide for themselves 
whether they subsidized Chōsen gakkō was a security risk in violation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 270 against North Korea, which states that no funding can be given to any 
program that finances nuclear technology and North Korea.
166
 
It was never explained why this had anything to do with the abduction issue itself, 
only that subsidies to Chōsen gakkō might possibly be used for science projects within the 
Chōsen University, which is not related to the abduction issue in any way. The discussion 
then continued about how the science departments in the schools might form a threat because 
students were learning computer science and chemistry, skills they could pass on to North 
Korea during their trips. Matsubara opined that “the very existence of the science department 
of the Korean University cannot coexist with the UN Resolution” (Chōsendaigakkō no rika-
kei no sonzai jitai ga kokurenketsugi no ni ni nana rei-gō ni teishoku o suru to iwazaru o enai 
wakedearimasu).
167
 What is interesting about this, is that Chōsen gakkō is heavily discussed 
within a committee that is specifically meant to solve the abduction issue; however, none of 
the members talking about Chōsen gakkō bring up how it is related to the abduction issue, or 
how anything related to Chōsen gakkō could help solve the abduction issue. Nonetheless, they 
still feel very strongly – “absolutely” (“zehi”) and “firmly” (“shikkari”) are words that 
indicate strong feelings here – about Chōsen gakkō and are willing to focus on this rather than 
on solving the abduction issue. This is just one example of how Chōsen gakkō is used 
constantly within the North Korea security discourse. Even if Chōsen gakkō, no matter how 
dubious they may seem, have nothing to do with the issue at hand, government officials will 
still find a way to express their concern over the existence of the schools and to tie it to 
international and domestic security. This was also noticeable during the symposia I attended 
for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet personnel. No matter what the initial topic 
was, as long as it had something to do with North Korea, or Koreans in Japan (human rights, 
North Korean education, and North Korean returnees), the topic would inevitably change to 
the abduction issue and then someone would remark that Chōsen Sōren should be stopped.168 
This, of course, creates the discourse that Chōsen gakkō are more part of an international plot 
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to destroy Japan than an educational institution within Japan; the very nature of the sentences 
uttered can be connected to legitimation techniques of instilling fear, anger and protectiveness. 
Plus, the comment that was made about Chōsen gakkō’s scientific research being a threat 
because of the nuclear power that could be developed is, whatever the reality may be, a severe 
case of representing Chōsen gakkō for own gain. 
Mentioning the UN Security Council Resolution (which only mentions North Korea) 
also helps to create a discourse of international legitimacy: The United Nations – despite the 
actual position of the UN Human Rights Committee that North Korean education in Japan 
should be funded – is framed here as agreeing with Japan that Chōsen gakkō are an evil entity, 
giving Japan the legitimacy to discuss this issue as an international problem that needs to be 
solved. Moreover, the above-mentioned Matsubara also advocated that the knowledge of this 
resolution should be spread to the local governments so that they can learn from it too, noting 
that Governor Koike Yuriko of Tokyo, known for her anti-Korean sentiments (as also touched 
upon in Chapter 5), will be “incredibly enthusiastic” about these discussions (“kiwamete 
nesshin ni suru kanōsei ga arimasu”). 169  This statement also signals just how badly 
Matsubara wants Chōsen gakkō to lose subsidies; he wants the local governments to use what 
he sees as international legitimacy for prohibiting subsidies. 
Another example of the security aspect is that, in a discussion of the subsidy issue in a 
finance committee meeting with prime minister Abe, one member of the committee, 
Maruyama, stated that “surely” (masashiku) Chōsen gakkō is praising the missile launches 
and abduction issues in its education (sono shisō o raisan suru yōna kyōiku o yatte iru 
wakedesu yo).
170
 This certainty (also evident from the “yo”, a particle indicating strong 
feelings) with which Chōsen gakkō is portrayed  as an obvious enemy of the state shows the 
importance of the schools as a security trope. Again, during another abduction commission 
meeting, the Japanese sanctions after yet another missile test by North Korea in 2016 are 
discussed. One of the committee members, Nagao Takashi (LDP), remarks that the Chōsen 
gakkō subsidy issue should have been used as part of the sanctions, asking why this was not 
the case.
171
 When the government official replies that they thought it would not be the most 
effective way to solve the issue (“hōkatsu-teki ni kaiketsu suru tame ni nani ga mottomo kōka-
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teki ka to iu kanten […]Chōsengakkō hojokin mondai wa hairenai katachi ”), Nagao notes 
that he feels resentful towards the Minister of Foreign Affairs for this (“chotto ikidori”), and 
that he will meet with PSIA in order to discuss the relations between Chōsen gakkō and 
Chōsen Sōren (“Kōanchōsachō-san ni o kiki shimasu”).172 This does not only focus on the 
fact that Chōsen gakkō is again associated with a security risk, but also with another theme 
that will be discussed more in depth in a later section, namely that Chōsen gakkō and North 
Korea are treated as if they are interchangeable, hence as if terminating subsidies for Chōsen 
gakkō is going to sanction North Korea in any way. PSIA is here coined as the authority on 
the issue of Chōsen gakkō, which, by PSIA’s nature as a security institution, makes Chōsen 
gakkō a security issue as well. 
PSIA too sees Chōsen gakkō as a security risk, although it is less clear and direct about 
what that security risk precisely is, or how to tie it to existing security threats. In the PSIA 
introductory leaflet it states that all its annual reports feature “insights into domestic and 
international situations related to public security matters”.173 It is telling that from 2011 to 
2017, Chōsen gakkō has been mentioned in all its annual reports. Most of the risk they cover 
concerns the ‘ideology education’ (shisōkyōiku) expressed by Kim Jong-Un, considered one 
of the most threatening aspects in combination with Chōsen gakkō.174 Often, however, the 
mere existence of the schools is evident as a threat, as seen in several columns in PSIA’s 
annual overviews, which are just a description of the Chōsen gakkō activities and festivities 
over the year.
175
 Of course, PSIA is an institution dedicated to collecting intelligence of 
‘subversive organisations’176, hence it is natural that their emphasis, when discussing an issue, 
is on the security aspect. Nonetheless, when comparing the chapters on Chōsen Sōren and 
Chōsen gakkō with, for instance, the chapters on North Korea, it is evident that PSIA has a 
much clearer image of what the threat actually is when discussing the North Korean regime. 
For instance, in its 2016 report the sectional title for North Korea was amongst others 
“Kokusai-teki koritsu no daha o mosaku shitsutsu, kaku misairu senryoku no zōkyō o koji shi, 
wagakuni, Beikoku nado kokusai shakai o yusaburu Kitachōsen”177 (North Korea that tries to 
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break through international isolation, strengthens its nuclear and missile power, and shocks 
Japan, the U.S. and the international community). In contrast, for Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen 
gakkō, the sectional titles were “Kim jon un  tō iin-chō e no chūsei kyōka to soshiki no kassei-
ka ni torikumu Chōsensōren” (Chōsen Sōren is striving to revitalize the organisation and to 
strengthen loyalty to the party leader Kim Jong Un), and “Chōsendaigakkō sōritsu 60-shūnen 
o meguru dōkō”(Attitude of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean 
University).
178
 While the first title for North Korea already explains three security issues 
related to North Korea, the one for Chōsen Sōren is already much more subtle (probable 
loyalty to Kim Jong Un) and the one for Chōsen gakkō does not carry any hint of a security 
issue. The fact that Chōsen gakkō are still included shows determination to treat them as a 
security problem; a ‘subversive organisation’. All this vagueness about how exactly they 
constitute a threat also corresponds with techniques of de-legitimising Chōsen gakkō, without 
the Japanese government having to make a commitment regarding to how exactly solve the 
issue. Because the definition of what a ‘subversive organisation’ actually constitutes is vague 
too, it allows the PSIA within their brief to keep monitoring Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren. 
Interestingly, a separate discourse within the Diet that runs alongside that of security is 
one of denying national responsibility. After the final decision in 2013 to remove Chōsen 
gakkō from the TWP, the Abe cabinet does not have a say anymore in how or when Chōsen 
gakkō receive subsidies, and this is something that it emphasizes often: “It is a fact that local 
governments have taken measures” (“Kakuken ni oite samazamana tokurei no sochi ga tora 
rete ita no wa jijitsudearimasu.”)179 “It should be judged by the local government, which is 
the appropriate authority.” (“Shokatsu-chōdearu todōfuken ni oite tekisetsu ni han dan sa rete 
ikubeki mono to iu fū ni rikai shite gozaimasu.”180) “Management [of the issue] is secured by 
responsibility and judgement of the prefectural governor.” (“Todōfuken chiji no sekinin to 
handan ni oite sono un'ei ga kakuho sa rete iru to iu monodegozaimasu.”181) “MEXT is not in 
a position to command supervision directly.” (“Bunkashō to shite wa chokusetsu ni 
shikikantokusuru tachiba ni wa nai to iu kotodegozaimasu.” 182 ) The only thing the 
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government ascertained was that the local governments had the jurisdiction to retract any and 
all funding. This might be a smart decision by the Abe government. Despite its hostile 
position on anything North Korea related, it realizes its inability to do anything substantial 
about the issue. As discussed before, the government cannot just prohibit the schools because 
ethnic education is legal in Japan; in fact, there is very little that it can do. Putting the 
responsibility for dealing with Chōsen gakkō at the local level is also a cunning way to make 
sure that, as shown in the examples above, when asked why the cabinet is not doing more to 
stop Chōsen gakkō, it can defend itself by stating that the issue is out of its jurisdiction now. 
While we cannot know for sure that this was a reason for prime minister Abe to change the 
policy back in 2013, it certainly now is a consequence that the government benefits from. 
 
6.1.3. Loyalty: Do Koreans belong to “All Japan”? 
Another theme that is part of the discourse is the concern, or perhaps the irritation, that 
Zainichi Chōsenjin seem to have different loyalties, or loyalties that are torn between the 
Japanese government and the North Korean regime. This can be explained in two ways. First, 
the Japanese government does not like having its legitimacy as the ruler challenged by this 
minority. Second, as I will explain in depth in the next section, this position is also a tactic of 
exclusion by the Japanese government, which, as we also have seen in Chapter 2, does not 
recognize dual citizenship, and hence does not believe those who do not take up Japanese 
citizenship belong to the population of “All Japan” that has to be protected from North Korea. 
In the MEXT research report of 2011-2013 and the TMG research of 2013, it becomes 
evident too that uncertainty about loyalty is a prominent problem. There are four issues that 
are most frequently discussed relating to this theme.  
The first issue is the overarching concern that the education is “too Korean”. In this 
case it does not even necessarily mean North Korean, but Korean in general. For instance, the 
MEXT research group feels offended by the fact that, when Chōsen gakkō teaches about 
Japan’s territorial disputes with other countries, it refers to the island that the Japanese call 
Takeshima by its Korean name Dokdo (Japan has a territorial dispute about this island with 
South Korea). This makes the committee question whether Chōsen gakkō is teaching the 
Japanese position on this issue or not.
183
 The same problem occurs when discussing history 
issues, especially colonial history. Chōsen gakkō teaches this from a Korean perspective, 
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something that MEXT strongly disagrees with.
184
  TMG showed similar sentiments in its 
report, urging Korean highschools to revise descriptions of the abduction issue, the Cold War 
era, and the history of Zainichi Koreans, because they were deemed to be inappropriate 
(“futekisetsu de aru”).185 This shows that loyalty is an issue for the Japanese government 
when the Korean minority is concerned, even when it is not loyalty specifically to another 
(hostile) state or leader. As we have seen in Chapter 2, this also coincides with the historical 
revisionist stance that the LDP supports. 
Secondly, the presupposed loyalty to former and current leaders of North Korea is also 
an issue. While Chōsen gakkō has stated that it will not hang portraits of Kim Jong-Un on the 
walls, it does display portraits of Kim Jong-Il and Kim Il-Sung in highschools and the 
University. MEXT, the Diet and the TMG remain concerned about these portraits, feeling that 
this would mean that all students will be loyal to the North Korean regime. At the same time, 
they worry that, now that Kim Jong-Un is the leader, the schools will put up his portrait as 
well.
186
 This coincides with the concern that students are being taught too much about the 
Kim dynasty and ideology. The TMG report devotes three pages to listing songs children have 
to learn about either the Kim family or North Korea as the fatherland
187
, but interestingly, it 
does not comment on them. The fact that they are mentioned in the report indicates that TMG 
disagrees with them, but in contrast to other issues the report discusses, it does not ask for 
alternatives for these nursery rhymes, nor does it provide them. Again, this vagueness only 
serves to defame the ‘other’. 
As already touched upon in the second section, when we look at PSIA and their 
assessment of Chōsen gakkō’s and Chōsen Sōren’s security situation, alleged loyalty to Kim 
Jong-Un comes up extremely often. Almost all PSIA discussed was the ideological education 
regarding Kim Jong-Un that Chōsen Sōren/gakkō would have to consider implementing 
according to the DPRK, and the loyalty of Zainichi Chōsenjin to the North Korean regime in 
general. For instance in 2015, “Ideological education activities are a top priority, to learn 
about Kim Jong-Un’s greatness among others.” (“Shisō kyōiku katsudō o saiyūsenkadai ni 
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kakage, kono Chū de, -kin Kimu jon'un sei on dai 1 shoki no `idai-sei' o kyōchō suru gakushū 
ni torikumu koto.”188), and in 2016, “Appeal for loyalty to Kim Jong-Un.” (“Kimu jon'un tō 
iin-chō e no chūsei o apīru.” 189) In fact, Kim Jong-Un’s name is mentioned more frequently 
in the chapters on Chōsen Sōren than in the chapters on the DPRK.190 This too shows that 
concern about loyalty to Kim Jong-Un is one of the main issues that PSIA finds with Chōsen 
Sōren and Chōsen gakkō. This translates into a fear that the Chōsen community does not see 
the Japanese government as its legitimate ruler, but is first and foremost loyal to the North 
Korean regime.  
The third issue that relates to loyalty is MEXT’s concern about a direct loyalty 
proclamation to Pyongyang, caused by the fact that Chōsen gakkō organise trips to 
Pyongyang. During these trips, they watch or participate in an opera that proclaims loyalty to 
Kim Jong-Un and Kim Jong-Il. MEXT, in their research regarding Chōsen gakkō, notes that it 
had heard that about 100 students had watched this opera and proclaimed their loyalty.
191
 
Chōsen gakkō’s response to these allegations, namely that, “highschool students did not 
participate, it is not a school activity” (“Izure mo kōkyū-bu no seito wa sanka shite inai to no 
kaitō. Mata, hatsu chūkyū-bu no jidō seito ga sanka shite iru baai mo, gakkō gyōjide wa naku, 
sanka kibō no jidō seito ga jiyū ishi de sanka shite ori, gakkō wa kan'yo shite inai to no 
kaitō”)192  seems to fall on deaf ears. While the statement might be untrue, there are no 
documents that show whether MEXT did any follow-up research after this statement. Five 
years later, the issue of studying in Pyongyang is again brought up by the Special Committee 
for the North Korean Abduction Issue, where Matsubara alleges that the students are obliged 
to study in North Korea, and that this creates “incredibly deep bonds between the authorities 
of North Korea and the Korean University” (Kō itta kiwamete fukai kizuna ga Kitachōsen no 
o tōkyoku to aru Chōsendaigakkō).193 Repeatedly, expressive adjectives such as “incredibly 
deep bonds” are used to create a divide between Japan’s shared ideologies and beliefs, and 
those of the Chōsen community. 
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The final reason for MEXT to doubt loyalty is that the Chōsen curriculum does not 
sufficiently discuss the abduction issue. In the revised edition of Chōsen textbooks (that are 
currently used), Chōsen gakkō has deleted any ‘unfair or inappropriate’ mention of the 
abduction issue
194
, but has not replaced them; it has simply done away with discussing the 
issue.
195
 For MEXT, this compromise is not enough, since, as it states, “On the basis of the 
‘Basic plan of Human Rights education and awareness’, human rights must be taught with the 
example of the abduction issue, also in Korean schools” (Seifu wa,`jinken kyōiku keihatsu ni 
kansuru kihon keikaku' ni motodzuki, Chōsengakkō mo fukumu samazamana ba o tsūji, 
rachimondai-tō no jinken kyōiku keihatsu no suishin o hakaru koto to shite iru).196 This is not 
the only mention of the lack of attention for the abduction issue in the Chōsen curriculum. In 
a later meeting, the question is asked why Chōsen gakkō does not teach anything about the 
abduction issue, either by textbook or by showing the movie Megumi, an anime about the 
abduction of Megumi Yokota.
197
 The apparent lack of what MEXT seems to view as 
solidarity with an important national issue such as the abduction case is one of the most 
important conclusions in the assessment of Chōsen gakkō. As mentioned above, TMG too 
finds the abduction issue one of the thorny issues when dealing with Chōsen gakkō.198 This 
again shows how the abduction trauma is linked to Chōsen gakkō, even though Chōsen gakkō 
has nothing to do with it. 
In short, all the different branches of the Japanese government display distrust 
regarding Zainichi Chōsenjin’s loyalty. The main reason for this, no matter what the activity, 
is the still prominent presence of the Kim family in Chōsen gakkō, be it in songs, portraits or 
education. The fact that students of the Korean University go on exchange to Pyongyang adds 
fuel to this fire. As an added bonus, the Japanese government has very strong ideas about 
history teaching and history textbook revision, as well as about national issues, which makes 
the Korean perspective seem to constitute a threat to its legitimacy. 
 
6.1.4. Exclusion and Disapproval: Chōsen by any other name is still North Korea 
In the discourse it is clear that the Japanese government does not see Chōsen gakkō as a 
domestic or minority issue, but as an extension of an international problem. Perhaps the most 
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telling example of this can be found in the annual reports of the PSIA. In these reports, the 
PSIA categorizes every possible situation related to public security matters, internal threats as 
well as external threats. For instance, Islamic State comes under ‘external threats’, and Aum 
Shinrikyo, the Japanese sect that was responsible for the gas attack on the Tokyo metro in 
2000, is filed under ‘internal threat’.199 Interestingly, Chōsen Sōren (and thus, by definition, 
Chōsen gakkō) is treated as part of the North Korean threat, and thus filed under ‘external 
threat’ (“kokugai jōsei: kitachōsen・chōsen sōren” - Foreign state of affairs: North Korea and 
Chōsen Sōren).200 Every year from 2011 to 2016, the PSIA has mentioned Chōsen gakkō as 
being an external threat to safety and stability. Interestingly, none of the reports ever give a 
reason why exactly it is being treated as such. For instance, in the 2016 annual report there is 
an extensive column on the Korean University’s 60th anniversary,201 which only points out 
that the festivities were organized by the university and the fact that they celebrated.  
As discussed in previous sections, ideology education is discussed, but the emphasis 
remains on how the leader of Chōsen Sōren wants to implement this, not on the schools 
themselves. While Chōsen Sōren is mentioned more elaborately, with identified threats such 
as communication with the North Korean regime and the smuggling of illegal substances, 
PSIA links Chōsen gakkō only as a term to an actual threat when discussing the 
demonstrations and court cases set up by Zainichi Chōsenjin.202 (In 2013: “`Kōkō mushō-ka' 
tekiyō o motome soshō o teiki”203 - Lawsuit filed seeking free highschool tuition; in 2014: 
“`Kōkō mushō-ka' tekiyō ya jichitai `hojokin' shikyū saikai ni muketa torikumi o keizoku”204 - 
Continued efforts to resume subsidy and “free highschool tuition” with local governments; in 
2015: “`Kōkō mushō-ka' tekiyō ya jichitai `hojokin' kakutoku ni muketa torikumi o tenkai”205 - 
The development of efforts to apply for highschool tuition and local subsidies.) 
These protests and appeals focus solely on the efforts to get the subsidies back. What I 
find the most striking about this issue, is that these actions by Chōsen gakkō and others are 
perfectly legal. They have the right to sue the Japanese government, and to protest peacefully. 
Yet, the PSIA discusses the mobilization of activists and school officials to protest and 
conduct propagandist activities as being a security situation.
206
 The fact that peaceful protests 
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are seen as a security concern (even if it is only stated as a happening, there are no emotive 
expressions involved) suggests that the PSIA is adamant to find concerns about Chōsen gakkō 
and to exploit these concerns to the fullest, again discrediting Chōsen gakkō and portraying 
them as an overly emotional/irrational entity.  
In a similar fashion, during one of the abduction committee’s meetings, Nagao notes 
that the Chōsen gakkō issue is like ‘turning on the hot water for a bath, but not putting the 
plug in’ (“Jaguchi o hinette oyu o tameyou to omotte mo o furo no sen ga nukete iru yōna 
jōtaida to iu fū ni iwa rete mo itashikatanai”), because, he claims that, while the UN Security 
Council has adopted resolutions against North Korea and PSIA has voiced its concerns, the 
Japanese government is not doing enough to stop Chōsen gakkō.207 Again, no distinction is 
made here between North Korea and Chōsen gakkō. It is treated as part of an alien entity 
instead of as a domestic organisation, or at least as both. And again, the reason for the 
resentment against Chōsen gakkō remains either very vague or completely undiscussed. When 
looking at this metaphor, Nagao makes it sound like the UN is wasting effort, when, 
borrowing his metaphor, the faucet is actually running in a completely different bathtub than 
the one he is talking about. 
In the same fashion, the former MEXT minister Hase Hiroshi noted in a 2016 
statement directed at Chōsen gakkō that “Our country’s government has recognized that 
Chōsen Sōren is affiliated with North Korea and this therefore affects the 
education”( Chōsengakkō ni kanshite wa, wagakuni seifu to shite wa, Kitachōsen to 
missetsuna kankei o yūsuru dantaidearu Chōsensōren ga, sono kyōiku o jūyō-shi shi, kyōiku 
naiyō, jinji oyobi zaisei ni eikyō o oyoboshite iru mono to ninshiki shite orimasu.; underlining 
mine)
208
 Not only does this again lump Chōsen gakkō together with the DPRK (using Chōsen 
Sōren as intermediate step), it also incorporates a wording that is prevalent in other documents 
too. The notice is directed towards Chōsen gakkō, but when arguing that Chōsen gakkō is 
affiliated with North Korea, Hase also uses the terminology “our country’s government” 
(wagakuni seifu), the opposite of which is “your/other country”, i.e. North Korea. This is 
another indication that Chōsen gakkō and affiliated people are not seen as part of the Japanese 
people, but as outsiders. 
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This tendency is ubiquitous in all documents. Both in the Diet and in the PSIA reports, 
the term ‘Japan’ (Nihon, Nippon) is never used, only “waga no kuni” or “wagakuni”. This is 
common in all Diet discussions (not just the ones about Chōsen gakkō), but in combination 
with other terms the dichotomy becomes more visible. For instance, in a discussion about the 
security risk that Chōsen gakkō pose, Aoyagi Yōichirō (DPJ), a member of the abduction 
issue committee, argued that the government needs to react to Chōsen gakkō in order to 
protect “All Japan” (ōru japan).209 In this case, it is very clear that people affiliated with 
Chōsen gakkō do not belong to what he considers to be “All Japan”; they are excluded from 
the discourse.  
Another thing that becomes clear from the source material and that adds to the 
discourse, is not only that the government focusses on Chōsen gakkō as a security issue, but 
also that Zainichi Chōsenjin are not seen as a minority within Japanese society. After 
explaining the UN Security Council resolutions regarding North Koreans not being allowed 
professional training or education in fields related to nuclear power, Yamada Kenji (LDP), a 
member of the legislative council, remarks that “nonetheless” (“nimokakawarazu”) the 
Korean University is allowed to have science and engineering departments.
 210
  This rhetoric 
puts Chōsen gakkō on the same page as the North Korean regime. This is the same argument 
as discussed in section 6.1.2 (but made by a different person), but this time with a different 
undertone than just security. He continued saying that he had heard that the University had 
told Kim Jong-Un that for the University’s 60th anniversary they will prepare the power to 
destroy the U.S. and Japan (“Mata, dō daigaku wa, sakunen no sōritsu rokujusshūnenkinen 
gyōji ni oite, kanemasa on sō shoki ni mukete, nichibei o kaimetsu dekiru chikara o totonoeru 
to hyōmei shita to kiite orimasu.”).211 This is indicative as to how the government sees the 
people attending Chōsen gakkō not as people under its responsibility, but as the people it has 
the responsibility to protect its own people from. “Power” and “destroy” here are emotive 
words used to elicit fear and a sense of protectiveness. Chōsen gakkō in this context is made 
out to be the same as North Korea, with the same goals as North Korea, namely to please Kim 
Jong-Un and to obliterate Japan and the United States. As mentioned in the previous Section, 
again there is no mention of the fact that, if Chōsen gakkō would work on nuclear power or 
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arms in order to help North Korea destroy Japan, this would also mean that they are actively 
working towards destroying their own community, families, friends and homes. Zainichi 
Chōsenjin are by definition not the same as North Koreans, of only because they have lived in 
Japan all their lives. While this does not necessarily imply loyalty to the Japanese government 
(which the Japanese government needs), at the same time one cannot generalize Chōsen 
gakkō as being the same as the North Korean government’s threat.  
Furthermore, from this excerpt we can see that Yamada bases this information, which 
is actually a serious allegation, on something that “he has heard”. This shows how deep the 
sentiment of “Chōsen gakkō are not part of our society” actually reaches. In addition, this 
statement is not further questioned or verified by the Committee, it is just taken for granted. 
In the same committee meeting, there is an example of another trait that coincides with 
the exclusion of Chōsen gakkō from Japanese society, namely plain disapproval. After 
Yamada Kenji has expressed his concerns about Chōsen gakkō in relation to the UN Security 
Council resolution, the head of the Budget Committee notes that the government does not 
think that the subjects taught at the Chōsen University are at odds with this resolution 
(“mondai ni naru to kangaete ha orimasen”, we do not think this will be a problem); however, 
regardless of that (“izurenishimashite mo”), the government will keep a close watch on 
Chōsen gakkō, as it recognizes that it is a serious issue. 212 Why exactly this is a serious issue, 
and why it should be monitored if the government believes that it has got nothing to do with 
the UN resolution against nuclear technology for North Koreans, is not explained. Thus, it 
signals that, while the government cannot pinpoint anything legally wrong with Chōsen gakkō, 
it has a tendency to disagree with it for the sole fact that it is Chōsen gakkō. 
 This is not only manifest in the committee meeting. It is a tendency that emerges also 
in the MEXT research into Chōsen gakkō subsidies. When discussing the subjects taught in 
Chōsen highschools, and the specific contents of these subjects, the research committee notes 
that the content of the education does not meet MEXT’s criteria because, among others, 
“descriptions different from the government’s point of view occur, namely “[…] one-sided 
views on historical events and emotional or exaggerated expressions [in lessons]”( Seifu 
kenkai to kotonaru kijutsu […] rekishi-tekina jishō ni taisuru ichimen-tekina kenkai, jōcho-
teki kochō-teki hyōgen-tō).213 As we have seen in Chapter 2 and other sections of the present 
Chapter, the Japanese government often disagrees with different Chōsen gakkō stances, but 
there is a certain irony lost here when MEXT tells Chōsen gakkō that they are being one-sided 
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and emotional about certain issues. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the Japanese government is 
very peculiar about historical textbook revision and attention for the abduction issue. From 
this we can also conclude that the government feels that, by defying its ‘opinion’, Chōsen 
gakkō is denying the government its legitimacy as the agency that decides what a school can 
and cannot teach, a denial that the Japanese government does not desire. 
 
6.2 What does this tell us about the Japanese government? 
The four themes discussed show the dominant discourse applied by the Japanese government, 
and how it shapes its identity in relation to Chōsen gakkō. The Japanese government treats 
Chōsen gakkō primarily as a military issue, that is, the schools are something that has to be 
stopped or monitored in order to safeguard Japan. The loyalty aspect shows that the Japanese 
government is unhappy with the fact that it has to deal with a minority group, the loyalty of 
which is not necessarily solely to the Japanese government, but possibly also to another, 
hostile entity. Through these two aspects, the Japanese government ensures that it portrays 
Chōsen gakkō as part of Chōsen Sōren, and Chōsen Sōren as part of North Korea. In this way, 
it can treat the issue from an international security point of view, at the same time showing its 
disregard for the community that it does not consider to be part of its sphere. Finally, it has 
become clear that the issue of Chōsen gakkō has very little to do with education, and much 
more with politics. It is clear that, as far as identity is concerned, the government focusses 
much more on the political identity that Chōsen Sōren promotes, and not on the ethnic 
identity that Chōsen gakkō seem to be fighting for, and it is the political identity that is related 
to North Korea as a regime that is problematic to the Japanese government. 
In my opinion, the most important conclusions to take away from this analysis are as 
follows. The different branches of the Japanese government are on the same page when it 
comes to Chōsen gakkō. All associate Chōsen gakkō with Chōsen Sōren, but especially the 
Diet and the PSIA stress ties to North Korea.  
The fact that the Diet and the PSIA discuss the North Korean proliferation threat 
against Japan, stating that Chōsen gakkō is on North Korea’s side, is a provocative discourse. 
A missile or nuclear attack on Japan by North Korea would hurt Zainichi as devastatingly as it 
would Japanese people, especially since Japan’s most well-known cities like Tokyo and 
Osaka both have huge Korean populations. It is provocative to pretend that they would not be 
victims of the same aggression, just because they are not Japanese citizens. Yet this rhetoric 
fits with the nationalism of the Abe government, as well as with its effort to revise the 
constitution in favour of a more militarized Japan.   
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Furthermore, the Japanese government creates a paradox, because it is afraid that 
Zainichi Chōsenjin are loyal to North Korea, but at the same time it actively creates a 
discourse in which Zainichi Chōsenjin are seen as outside of the sphere that Japan has to 
protect and serve, and it makes no effort to include the minority within its discourse. This 
might also be because, as the data shows, there is often no concrete threat that they can tie 
specifically to Chōsen gakkō. There is a lot of insecurity about what is actually going on. 
Finally, this analysis shows that the Japanese government would perhaps prefer to get 
rid of Chōsen gakkō altogether, but since that is not legally possible, it has tried to arrange it 
in such a way that the national government is no longer responsible for dealing with the issue, 
but at the same time can benefit from it by using it for different goals and purposes. 
 
6.3 Legitimating stances: A Discourse of Love to Hate 
What we can infer from the discourse is that the Japanese government sees its identity as the 
protector of Japan, using the fear of North Korea’s aggressions and the need for domestic 
security measures as one of its main concerns regarding this issue. This is in line with 
Chilton’s technique of “stimulating emotions”: instilling fear and protectiveness.214 It has 
created the authority figure of the Japanese government that must protect the Japanese people 
against North Korea and anything that resembles it. This identity, as sources have shown, is 
exceptionally rigid and singular in focus. The ‘Japanese trauma’ of the abduction issue plays a 
large role in the narrative, receiving an excessive amount of attention when discussing an 
issue that cannot help solve the abduction cases.  
At the same time, both the Diet and the PSIA mark Chōsen gakkō as a ‘foreign threat’. 
They see the identity of Chōsen gakkō as being a part of Chōsen Sōren, and Chōsen Sōren as 
part of North Korea, not differentiating between them in terms of leadership. This, in turn, 
creates Chōsen gakkō as an entity that is dangerous both for Japanese security, and for the 
legitimacy of the Japanese government. The assumption that there is an alien entity on 
Japanese soil that might not see the Japanese government as legitimate, creates a discourse of 
exclusion. Both Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren are completely excluded from the definition 
of “Japan” that the Japanese government uses, showing another technique of de-legitimizing 
the Chōsen community. It also becomes clear that the Japanese government feels that its 
legitimacy is being challenged by Chōsen gakkō, because it feels that the lessons focus too 
much on being Korean, and on the Korean side of issues such as territorial conflicts and the 
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colonial era. It portrays the Chōsen community as overly emotional and irrational, having 
different priorities than the ‘self’ that the Japanese government portrays. 
 Another way in which the Japanese government legitimizes its hardline stance on 
Chōsen gakkō is by drawing on the UN Security Council. By mentioning this international 
body as being on the Japanese government’s side, it creates positive self-representation. It 
posits that the government is not the only official institution that maintains this belief, and 
instead that it is an assertion of the whole international community. This tactic of drawing on 
shared ideologies reaffirms the authority of the Japanese government and again excludes the 
Chōsen community. 
Interestingly, the techniques mentioned by Chilton to legitimize one’s own stance are 
hardly used by the Japanese government. Instead, it focuses mainly on gaining legitimation by 
de-legitimating the ‘other’. This also shows another theme in the discourse, namely general 
disdain and disapproval of the Chōsen community. Thus, the Japanese government, as 
described before creates, a paradox for itself: by excluding the Chōsen community from its 
narrative, but still urging the community to integrate into Japanese society (as we have seen in 
Chapter 2), demanding its loyalty. At the same time, it uses the existence of Chōsen gakkō as 
an example of North Korean threat, which it can utilize in other policy discussions, such as 
security. Concern for students’ education has very little attention in this debate, and neither 
has concern for the multi-ethnic identity of this particular minority. Unlike other examples of 
successful naturalization and successful ethnic identities, Zainichi Chōsenjin are essentially 
asked to use the naturalization process to wash their North Koreanness away. The perceived 
political identity of Chōsen gakkō is what the government focusses, and acts on. 
In contrast, while both Chōsen gakkō and Chōsen Sōren see the Japanese government 
as a discriminating enemy to their human rights, both have their own identity and wishes, and 
interact separately with their followers and with the several branches of the Japanese 
government. This dichotomy of Chōsen’s own identity versus Chōsen’s identity as perceived 
by the Japanese government is important, and will be revisited in Chapter 7. While Chōsen 
Sōren focuses on its roots in North Korea and its loyalty to the Kim family, Chōsen gakkō 
focuses much more on the general ‘ethnic education’ nature of its institution, drawing on the 
wish to help the Chōsen community feel proud of its ethnic heritage. It is much more 
compliant with what either MEXT or the local TMG ask of it. Their actions can be seen as a 
technique of drawing on shared ideological or historical principles, creating a feeling of 
‘being one of the group’.  
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Another technique worth noting is that, in terms of representation, the Chōsen 
community does use Chilton’s discourse technique of omitting the truth. Never does the 
Chōsen community actively touch upon the very thing that worries outsiders, its DPRK 
teachings, and its reverence for past North Korean leaders. It portrays itself as a regular ethnic 
school that is discriminated against, but never touches upon the subjects of the necessity of 
Kim Il-Sung nursery rhymes, or Juche ideology teachings. By completely ignoring this ‘North 
Korean’ aspect of Chōsen gakkō, its narrative becomes a very favourable one, one that 
attempts to convince outsiders of its legitimate position within Japanese society. 
The Chōsen community too draws upon the UN as international body for legitimation, 
it just uses a different body than the Japanese government does, to show its members that its 
position of being a victim of discrimination is a legitimate one, reinforced by multiple UN 
bodies. Where the Japanese government uses many negative tactics to try and defame the 
Chōsen community, the Chōsen community focuses more on discourse techniques of positive 
self-representation, performance boasting and rationality. It does slam the Japanese 
government for excluding Chōsen gakkō from subsidies, but mainly focuses its attention on 
its followers as the audience. In this sense, we can see that Chōsen gakkō has found a platform 
for a discourse of resistance, for within its own community, within an NGO dealing with 
human rights, and even within several UN bodies, it has found legitimation of its needs and 
wants. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: Who benefits? 
This thesis has tried to elucidate the situation of Chōsen gakkō in Japan. While at first sight 
North Korean schools existing in Japan may have seemed like an oddity, Chapter 2 has shown 
that both the creation of Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō were a logical result of Japan’s and 
Korea’s history. It was only in recent decades, when Japan-North Korea relations worsened 
until they hit an all-time low because of the abduction issue, nuclear program and the missile 
testing, that these schools became so contested, both by the Japanese government and the 
Japanese public. This has set the precedent for the way the current Japanese government has 
been dealing with Chōsen gakkō.  
 In addition to the aspect of the Japan-North Korea relations, we can see that the 
general attitude towards the Korean minority in Japan, both by the public and the Japanese 
government, has been anything but favourable. Discrimination has always been an issue, and 
has worsened in the last couple of years. The LDP’s and prime minister Abe’s historical 
revisionist views only worsen the divide, and this too has helped shape the two sides on which 
I have focused my research. Chapter 2 has also shown that the Japanese government treats the 
Chōsen community as a minority very differently from other minorities. This difference in 
treatment also allowed for an IR approach to the present research.  
 Relational constructivism, in its whole form, showed that government’s policies and 
reactions can be understood in a context of “Self” versus “Other”, where the need for 
legitimation plays a paramount role in how actors react. In many academic works, Japan has 
been positioned either as “Self” or “Other” with regards to China, Russia or North Korea, but 
seldom, if ever, against a minority in its own territory. Because of the international nature of 
this issue and because of the strong historical links of the Chōsen community with North 
Korea, I have used this international relations theory even though the actual issue seemed to 
be a domestic one. This proved to be a sensible decision. Looking at the Japanese government 
through several of its branches on the one side, and to the Chōsen gakkō (and the institution 
behind it) on the other side, provided me with a framework that clearly defined in which 
directions to search for answers to my questions. 
 Incidentally, both relational constructivism and political discourse analysis put focus 
on legitimation, or legitimizing techniques. This ensured that the theoretical and 
methodological framework fit together well, thus allowing me to research the dominant 
discourse within the Japanese government on the issue of Chōsen gakkō, and the discourse of 
resistance within Chōsen gakkō against the Japanese government. By researching what 
constitutes the process by which the discourse, and thus the stance of both parties on this issue, 
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is formed, it was possible to extract from this why Chōsen gakkō exist in Japan in the specific 
way that they do, and who benefits (purposefully or not) from this specific situation.  
 The analysis has shown that all branches of the Japanese government move 
over the spectrum of the four themes that I have defined within its discourse. These themes 
are education, security, loyalty, disapproval and exclusion. The Japanese government sees 
itself as the righteous “Self” that has to defend its territory and society against an evil “Other”, 
which is shown in the way that ‘security’ remains the main issue when discussing Chōsen 
gakkō. The branches of government use techniques of defamation, scapegoating, and instilling 
fear of the “Other”. Thus, a discourse is created where the ruling technique is one of 
inclusion/exclusion in terms of beliefs and ideologies, the “Other” is overly emotional, 
annoying, but above all, dangerous.  
An interesting point of note here is that the creation of Chōsen gakkō as this “Other” 
has perhaps other consequences than theorizing another nation as an “Other”. While the 
government criticizes the supposed loyalty of Chōsen gakkō to North Korea and the Kim 
family, it at the same time actively excludes this group from its narrative of “Japan”. This 
vicious circle ensures that the Japanese government will most likely remain critical of Chōsen 
gakkō’s position, but will never extend a hand to the Chōsen community to become part of the 
in-crowd while being able to retain their ethnic identity. Even if they would naturalize, as long 
as they send their children to or attend Chōsen gakkō they will not belong to “All Japan”. The 
fact that Chōsen gakkō draw too much on Korean materials and Korean experiences in their 
lessons, as opposed to the Japanese view, plays a significant role here, especially when taking 
into account the Japanese government’s historical revisionist attitude. Chōsen gakkō is seen as 
challenging the Japanese government’s legitimation by not adhering to all the government’s 
wishes. This perception of Chōsen gakkō, combined with the discourse that Chōsen gakkō is 
being treated as being the same as Chōsen Sōren, as being the same as North Korea, creates a 
reason for the Japanese government to pursue its hardline stance. From Chapter 2 it became 
clear that the Japanese government does not mind that minorities within Japan retain their 
own ethnic identity. Other minorities have successfully incorporated their ethnic identity into 
their Japanese life, and the government has not opposed this. The problem here then derives 
from a perceived political identity, which is mainly promoted by Chōsen Sōren, as we have 
seen in Chapter 5. Because the government regards Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō as 
virtually the same, the struggle for an ethnic identity by parents, students and teachers, as 
shown through my interviews and student presentations, is ignored, and all focus is put on the 
problematic political identity, which is much more intertwined with North Korea. 
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 Chōsen gakkō, in its discourse of resistance, is backed by Chōsen Sōren and HURAK. 
Its ‘evil’ “Other” is the Japanese government, which tries to thwart its actions with 
discriminatory policy. Because Chōsen gakkō has found ways to voice this to the outside 
world, it actively creates a discourse of resistance. In a way, Chōsen gakkō search for the most 
tangible legitimation, namely to ultimately become a legitimate school instead of a 
miscellaneous one. This issue, together with the subsidy issue, is at the forefront of its 
discourse. Chōsen gakkō and HURAK try to convince people outside of their own community 
that Chōsen gakkō deserve rights, both by using de-legitimation techniques of defamation, but 
also by using legitimation techniques of shared beliefs and ideologies. Chōsen gakkō try to 
cooperate with the Japanese government and focus more on ethnic education in general as 
well as try to convince the government of their need for an ethnic identity, as do the parents 
and students involved. However, it also uses a representation technique of omitting truth, by 
never discussing any of the concerns that outsiders have and that are at the heart of the 
Chōsen gakkō issue. Chōsen Sōren too addresses the ‘wrongdoings’ of the Japanese 
government, but in addition addresses its followers with techniques of performance boasting 
and positive self-representation, drawing on historical events and gratitude towards the DPRK. 
In this way, it legitimizes its own position as benevolent leader of the Chōsen community. 
These differences in approach and audience also show that there is a distinct difference in 
identity between Chōsen Sōren and Chōsen gakkō. 
 Thus, all parties try to legitimize their positions and their actions. Chōsen gakkō, and 
the teachers, parents and students that constitute it, want to exist as an ethnic minority in 
Japan, Chōsen Sōren and the Japanese government want to exert influence over their 
respective people by emphasising the “otherness” of their rivals. What is striking is that both 
sides often use the same rhetoric to argue for their positions. For instance, both draw on 
resolutions or reports by the United Nations to show that they have international accreditation 
for their positions within the issue that is Chōsen gakkō. Both try to exert deontic and 
epistemological legitimation. 
So, who benefits? We can see from the analysis that the Japanese government, while 
certainly not pleased with the fact that these schools exist, has found a use for them in terms 
of utilizing them as an example of a dangerous entity within a security setting. At the same 
time, because it cannot prohibit the schools in full, it has put the responsibility at the local 
level, so that it does not have to answer to the grievances Diet members might have regarding 
this issue. The fact that Chōsen gakkō is seen as North Korea creates another aspect for the 
government to focus on when searching for ways to deal with, or punish the DPRK. 
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Separating Chōsen Sōren from Chōsen gakkō as the two organisations do themselves, 
Chōsen Sōren does benefit from this situation, albeit not on purpose. Chōsen Sōren has faced 
a steady decline both in members and in finances, and a “Self” versus “Other” struggle such 
as this one gives Chōsen Sōren the opportunity to reaffirm to the Chōsen community that it is 
the organisation Chōsenjin should get behind. Since the government has shown a disdain for 
this minority group, Chōsen Sōren can try and fulfil the role of the saviour of the community. 
That leaves us with Chōsen gakkō. From the discourse it has become clear that they 
want to be able to provide the Chōsen community with a tailored ethnic education, and that 
they do go to some lengths to change their ways in order to accommodate the Japanese 
government. From the interviews and speeches, it has become clear that they are trying to 
maintain their ethnic identity, not a political one, and have been trying to convince the 
Japanese government of this. However, so far this has brought them scant results. Not only is 
it the only organisation that does not benefit from this situation, it also is the only organisation 
that is effectively hurt by the Japanese government’s subsidy policy. Chōsen Sōren, and 
certainly the DPRK, do not suffer from those actions and arguably benefit from them in terms 
of the opportunities for affirming the identity of Chōsenjin in Japan as a victimised 
community. 
The Japanese government’s tendency to lump together all institutions is a paramount 
detail of this outcome. Chōsen gakkō do have an interesting and troublesome relationship with 
the DPRK, which does warrant a certain approach if that relation is to be fleshed-out and 
negated. However, if the government wants to punish the DPRK, hurt its proliferation 
programme and human rights violations, targeting Chōsen gakkō has not been an effective 
way of doing so: North Korea has conducted the most nuclear and missile tests in ten years. 
At the same time, in August 2017 HURAK booked its first victory against the local 
governments, securing subsidies for Chōsen highschools, meaning that the Japanese 
government’s actions are becoming less efficient and less useful. If such a court case victory 
was to continue as a trend, it would strengthen Chōsen gakkō’s and even Chōsen Sōren’s 
discourse of resistance, and eventually even weaken the Japanese government’s legitimacy on 
this issue.  
If the government would tailor-make its policy to the organisations as individual 
entities, and differentiate in their identities between ethnic and political, its policies might be 
more precise, more effective and more knowledgeable. This is something that would have to 
be researched further, but it might be worth trying, considering the current impasse the 
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situation is in now. As Ms A concluded her interview, “Watashitachi no kodomotachi no jidai 
niha imayori mo yokunaru koto ga negaimasu.”215 (I hope our children will see better days.) 
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Appendix 
Interview Ms A 
このメールインタビュー、本当にありがとうございます！できるだけ丁寧にお答え
ください。 
このインタビューは匿名です。 
 
1. 幼稚園から、大学まで朝鮮学校に出席しましたか。いつでしたか。どの朝鮮
学校に出席ましたか。 
→小学校１年生～高校３年生まで。群馬県の学校です。 
 
2. その体験の時に、あなたはあなたの教育によって、何かを失っていると感じ
ることはありましたか？または、何かを得たと感じることはありましたか？ 
→得たものは、朝鮮の歴史と言葉、友人達です。 
 また、政治的な面でも日本での報道では知らされることない情報も得られました。 
 失ったものは特別ありません。チャンスが無かったな、若しくは得られなかった
のは、大学進学に向けての教育やシステムでした。 
 当初は、日本学校への進学は好まれませんでした。できれば朝鮮大学や組織に進
むことが推奨されたからです。 
 
3. 朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学の課程について、何を覚えていますか。課程はいろいろ
な明確な性情がありましたか。現在の課程について、意見は何ですか。 
→沢山の思い出があります。当初は今と違って思想教育なども活発でした。 
民族衣装を着て通学していたこともあり、怖い思いなどもしましたし、逆に理解
ある日本人の方々を知ることもできました。校内では朝鮮語オンリーでしたし、
文化発表会も民族的なもの、祭日も日本とは合っておらず、子供ながらに(そうい
うものだ)と自覚しておりました。 
 
4. 卒業の後で、朝鮮総連とか朝鮮学校とか、規則がありますか。例えば、朝鮮
総連で働ければならないで、会費を支払えばならないでいますか。 
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→いいえ、何の規制や会費支払い等はありません。１円も払った記憶はありません。 
 
5. 可能なら、子供を持っていれば、子供に朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学を通わせります
か。どうしてですか。 
→私の子供は日本国籍なので、おのずと日本学校でしたが、もしも在日コーリアン
だったら、きっと迷っています。まだまだ大学進学には有利、と言えませんから。 
ただ、もう一方で私自身が得た感覚等は朝鮮学校に通ったから得たものもあるの
で・・・。 
学費も日本学校よりもかかるので、迷いますね。。 
 
6. 朝鮮学校の時に、差別を感じました？どうでしたか。その後で、例えば、就
職活動の時に、朝鮮学校の教育ので、差別を感じましたか。例を教えてくだ
さいますか。 
→身近な差別、といえば近所には同年代の子供たちが居ましたが、一切遊ぶことは
ありませんでした。それどころか(きっとその子供の親が言っていたのか？)ある日、
「朝鮮人は朝鮮へ帰れよ！」と小学生から言われましたし、通学路では稀ではあっ
たけど、嫌がらせを言う大人が居ました. 
 
夏は白と黒のチマチョゴリを着ていたせいもあり、マートで「今日はお葬式？変な
制服だね」と、見知らぬおばさんから言われたことも、右翼の車から怒鳴られた事
も。。。通学電車の中でカッターでスカートを切られたりもしました。 
今と違って、大学も狭き門でした。朝鮮学校は文科省が許可していない、というこ
とで入れない大学も多々ありました。第一志望だった大学が、大学検定は不要だ、
という情報を元に受験申込締め切り日に申請を出しに行ったら、「今年から必要に
なりました」と門前払い、泣きながら帰宅したのを思い出します。 
一人暮らしをするための住まいを探すのも１０件不動産を回ってやっとこ見つける
ことができたことも今となって思い出です。 
就職は同胞の貿易会社に勤めたのもあり、差別はありませんでした。 
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7. 国際マスコミと日本マスコミしばしばは「朝鮮学校は北朝鮮の宣伝だ」と言
っています。自分の経験に基づいて、その発言に賛成していますか。 
→見る角度を変えれば、そのように解釈されても仕方ないかもしれませんね。 
私の経験からしますと、情報の賛否はあっても自分の国のこと（正確には北半島）
を知る上で、日本政府に不都合な歴史も学んだことは有意義でした。大人になって
から、自分の目で公平、公正に物事をみることができたからです。よって、それら
の発言もある一方の思惑があってのことと理解しております。真実・事実は一つで
すから。 
なので、敢えて、賛成、反対は論じたくはありません。 
 
8. 朝鮮総連の会員ですか。其れなら、会員では、何をしますか。 
会費を払う会員ではありません。どの組織にも属しておりません。北・南問わず、
同胞のイベント等には出席して楽しんでおります。 
 
9. 朝鮮総連を止めた場合、どうして止めましたか。 
→組織には属しておりませんので、私には関連性のない質問となります。 
 
10.朝鮮学校と朝鮮総連の問題について、例えば朝鮮総連の警察捜査や朝鮮学校
の政府出資問題、意見はどうですか。 
→どこまでが事実なのか知る術はありません。日本人の組織においても反政府的な
組織や団体には、つきものだと理解しています。結構冷静に物事をみているのかも
しれません。また、助成金については今まで支給されていたものが取り止めになっ
た理由が、納得いきません。 
 
11.朝鮮総連・朝鮮学校について誤解が多くて、ほかの人に何かを教えたいんで
すか。 
→国境も国籍も平和を阻むものにしかならないのが哀しいです。 
 違いを認め合って平和に生きたいです。私たちの子供たちの時代には今よりも良
くなることを願います。 
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Interview Ms B 
 
1. 幼稚園から、大学まで朝鮮学校に出席しましたか。いつでしたか。どの朝鮮
学校に出席ましたか。 
→小学校１年生～高校３年生まで。東京都の学校です。 
 
2. その体験の時に、あなたはあなたの教育によって、何かを失っていると感じ
ることはありましたか？または、何かを得たと感じることはありましたか？ 
→得たものは、自分のルーツを学んだこと、友人、歴史等。 
 得られなかったものは大学進学に向けての情報や、それに向けた授業内容です。 
  
3. 朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学の課程について、何を覚えていますか。課程はいろいろ
な明確な性情がありましたか。現在の課程について、意見は何ですか。 
→日本学校との比較はできませんが、多分、普通の学校生活だと思います。 
 特別朝鮮学校だから、というのはなくて、当たり前の学園生活だったと記憶して
ます。 
 現在の課程については自分の子供を学校に行かせたので、尚更思うのですが、や
はり私達は 
 日本で生きていき死ぬわけだから、自分のルーツも学ぶ必要はあれど、大学など
進学する上で 
 より必要な、有利な？教育プログラムが必要だと考えます。 
 例えば、朝鮮の歴史について詳しく学ぶ分、日本史や世界史は深く学べないため、
大学進学する上で、塾などに行かなくてはなりません。 
 
4. 卒業の後で、朝鮮総連とか朝鮮学校とか、規則がありますか。例えば、朝鮮
総連で働ければならないで、会費を支払えばならないでいますか。→私は総
連組織に属していますが、会費は徴収にこないので、払っていません。 
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5. 可能なら、子供を持っていれば、子供に朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学を通わせります
か。どうしてですか。 
→私の子供は通わせました。民族学校で必要な教育、言葉や自分のルーツは知るべ
きと考えたからです。 
通わせて良かった、と思っています。 
 
6. 朝鮮学校の時に、差別を感じました？どうでしたか。その後で、例えば、就
職活動の時に、朝鮮学校の教育ので、差別を感じましたか。例を教えてくだ
さいますか。 
→チマチョゴリで通学していたので、差別用語である、「チョン」とよく言われま
した。既に言われ慣れてしまいました。就職の時には、大学からもお墨付きをもら
っていた大手の会社に履歴書を出した際、朝鮮籍であるがゆえに、開封もされない
まま返却され、怒った大学教授が申し立てをしてくれたことがあります。信じられ
ませんでした。 
結局は、その大学教授の紹介で別の会社に勤めることになりました。 
当時、チャンスの場が少なかったという事実は多々あります。 
 
7. 国際マスコミと日本マスコミしばしばは「朝鮮学校は北朝鮮の宣伝だ」と言
っています。自分の経験に基づいて、その発言に賛成していますか。 
→民族学校、と政治を切り離して考えて頂きたい！と声を大にして言いたいです。 
日本の文科省が望む教育プログラムではない、というのが理由なのか、政治的利用
に使われているのかは、さて置き、傷つくのは子供たちです。 
TV での報道、北朝鮮でミサイルが飛んだ、といえば、通学する子供たちに直接的な
危害、嫌がらせが起こります。 
ですから、勿論、反対です。 
 
8. 朝鮮総連の会員ですか。其れなら、会員では、何をしますか。 
はい。会員です。新年会や交流会などですが、最近では忙しくてなかなか参加でき
てません 
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9. 朝鮮総連を止めた場合、どうして止めましたか。 
→辞めていません。現在も続けています。 
 
10.朝鮮学校と朝鮮総連の問題について、例えば朝鮮総連の警察捜査や朝鮮学校
の政府出資問題、意見はどうですか。 
→No.7 と重複しますが、私は一人の親として、子供たちが安心して民族教育を受け
られる空気が必要だと思っています。政治的な報道によって、嫌がらせをする大人
たちが残念ながらいます。 
辛い思いをするのは決まって、弱者です。民族学校を政治とは切り離して考えても
らいたい。 
よって、補助金も出して頂きたいと思います。私達はきちんと税金も納めています。 
子供たちが通学路で大人から罵声を浴びせられて泣きながら帰ってきたこともあり
ます。 
 
11.朝鮮総連・朝鮮学校について誤解が多くて、ほかの人に何かを教えたいんで
すか。 
→弱者をいじめるような世の中にならないよう、 
 お互いの違いを認め合えるよう、双方、理解を深めたいと思いますし、 
 私自身もそのように生きてゆきたいです。 
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Interview Ms C 
1. どんな学校に教えましたか。 
大阪朝鮮高級学校という、在日コリアンの 15～18 歳の高校生の通う高校で教えてい
ました。大阪は全国的に見ても在日コリアンの数が多く、他の朝鮮学校と比べても
規模の大きな学校です。私が教えていた時期（2007~2014）は、一つの学年に 140 人
ほど、全校生徒５００人弱でした。 
サッカー、ラグビー、ボクシングで全国大会に出場しており、部活が盛んな学校と
しても有名です。 
最近はラグビーが特に有名です。 
 
2. 何の講座を教えましたか。カリキュラムは日本の学校と同じですか。 
私は日本語の授業を担当していました。 
日本語が全員話せるので、日本の高校の「国語」と同じものです。 
カリキュラムはほとんど同じと言えますが、全ての授業を朝鮮語で行うので、日本
語の授業以外は教えてる内容は同じですが、朝鮮語であるという違いがあるのと、
朝鮮の歴史、地理、などが科目に入っている点が違います。 
 
3. 朝鮮学校は日本の学校よりも優れていますか。 
どちらが優れている、とは一概には言えません。 
しかし、日本学校の教員たちが朝鮮学校に参観に来て、授業を受ける態度がよいこ
と、生徒の学習意欲が高いこと、道徳的にもすばらしいこと、などを挙げて、よく
驚いて帰ります。 
そういう面では朝鮮学校の教育がよい面があるのではと思います。 
また、朝鮮学校出身者が社会に出て大きな成果をあげている人が多いこともありま
す。 
 
4. なぜ仕事を止めましたか。朝鮮学校にもう一度教えませんか 
私は他に自分がやってみたい仕事があり、その夢をあきらめられなかったので、や
めました。 
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また、学校の仕事はかなり肉体的にも精神的にもハードだったこともあり、体調を
崩すことが多く、それも一つの原因です。 
いつか機会があるなら、朝鮮学校でまた教えたいとも思います。 
朝鮮学校での日々は大変でしたが、とても素晴らしいものでした。 
 
5. 朝鮮学校のカリキュラムについて、Cさんの意見は何ですか。 
カリキュラムについては全ての科目をきちんと把握できているわけではないので、
何とも言えませんが、日本語に関して言うのなら、もっと教材が頻繁に時代や生徒
に合わせて更新されるといいなと思います。 
教科書を更新するのは大仕事で、数年がかかります。 
しかし日本の教科書は毎年さまざまな会社が新しいものを作ります。 
そういうものも参考にし、今教えるべきことを反映したものがもっとあれば、子供
たちにとってもいいのではと思います。 
 
 
6. なぜ日本の学校の代わりに朝鮮学校で教えることに決めましたか。楽しかっ
たですか。  
私はもとから教師になるつもりはありませんでした。 
しかし朝鮮学校に教師が足りない、というところから、それでは朝鮮学校に恩返し
をするつもりで教師になることを決断しました。なので、日本学校で教えるという
発想はありませんでした。 
教師の素晴らしさを知った今でも、日本学校で教えたいとは思いません。 
私が教えたかったのは、日本語を通して、この日本で朝鮮人として生きる自分を肯
定し、表現することだからです。 
日本語で話し考える子供たちだからこそ、朝鮮学校で学ぶ日本語に大きな意味があ
ると思います。かれ、かのじょたちがどのような日本語に触れ、思考するかによっ
て、アイデンティティに大きな影響を与えます。 
日本語を通して朝鮮人を育てる、子供たちが新しい自分に言葉を通して出会う瞬間
に立ち会うたび、これより素晴らしい仕事はないと思いました。 
本当に楽しかったです。 
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7. 先生の学生は差別について話していましたか。学生は差別を受けていました
か。例を教えてくださいますか。朝鮮学校は差別の経験の規則がありますか。
（例えば、学校のカウンセラー、学校の心理学者） 
差別について、というと大きな枠組みになりますが、この数年間は高校無償化問題
があったことから、子供たちと差別について話す機会が多かったように思います。
また、自分たちが被害者であると同時に、加害者にもなりえるのだという観点から、
さまざまな差別（沖縄、アイヌの問題、セクシャルマイノリティや障害を持つ方へ
の視線など）について話す機会を設けていました。 
学生たちは常に自分たちだけが制度から除外されるのだ、という事実と向き合わね
ばならず、それはまさに差別であると思います。また、朝鮮学校の生徒だと分かる
と、道を歩いているだけで暴言を吐かれたり（北朝鮮に帰れ、など）、インターネ
ットでもいわゆるネット右翼から差別的なコメントをされたりなどあります。 
しかし朝鮮学校にはスクールカウンセラーがいません。 
教師たちが対応するしかない状況です。そういうことに遭遇したら、必ず学校に報
告するように、とは話しています。 
 
8. 学生の時に、先生の時に、C さんは差別を感じたことはありますか。例を教え
てくださいますか。 
何が差別か分からなくなるほど、たくさんの制度から私たちは除外されてきました。 
当時は日本の大学に行こうとすれば、高校の卒業資格を得るために試験を受けなく
てはいけませんでした。今でも一部の大学は朝鮮高校卒業者の受験資格を認めてお
らず、それによって必要な手続きや試験が増えます。 
教師をしているときにも、そのような本来不要なはずの手続きなどのミスにより、
志望校を受験できなかった子供もいました。 
また、私はチマチョゴリを着て通学していましたが、よくない視線でじろじろ見ら
れたり、暴言を吐かれた時にはとても怖かったです。 
その他にも、学校であると認められないために、運動場が取り上げられそうになっ
たりと、悲しい思いをしました。 
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9. 朝鮮学校に教えるために、前提条件は何ですか。朝鮮学校の教育は必須です
か。 
前提条件についてはよくわかりませんが、基本的には朝鮮大学校で学んだ生徒たち
が教師となります。一部、日本の学校で教員免許を取った生徒が教師になることが
ありますが、それは本人の希望と、学校側の希望が合った場合です。 
朝鮮語を話せる必要があるので、朝鮮学校の教育がほぼ必須と言えますが、北海道
の朝鮮学校に日本人の教師がいたように、必ずしも必須とは言えません。 
私にとっては必要だったと思います。 
 
10.そうあれば、朝鮮学校の学生の体験の時に、C さんは C さんの教育によって、
何かを失っていると感じることはありましたか？または、何かを得たと感じ
ることはありましたか？ 
何かを失っていると感じたことはありません。 
朝鮮学校の教育で不足を感じたことはあまりありません。 
むしろ朝鮮学校という特殊な環境（日本にいながら、全ての生活を朝鮮語で行い、
授業も朝鮮語で行う、同じバックグラウンドを持った友達に囲まれている）の中で、
私は自分のアイデンティティに誇りを持つことができ、それは今でも感謝している
ことです。 
朝鮮学校で育ったからこそ、私は自分の国の言葉も歴史も知っていますし、自分の
名前に恥じることなく、堂々としていられます。自分が朝鮮人であることを説明で
きる要素をたくさん持っていることが、私をまっすぐに立たせてくれていると思い
ます。 
 
11.可能なら、子供を持っていれば、子供に朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学を通わせります
か。どうしてですか。 
必ず、通わせたいと思います。 
大人になって出会った人たちの中で、私も在日コリアンです、とカミングアウトし
てくる人が何人もいました。しかしそのほとんどが、日本の名前で日本の国籍を持
ち、朝鮮語を話すこともできず、在日コリアンであるということをあまり話したが
らない人たちでした。 
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私が朝鮮名で仕事をし、朝鮮語を話す中で、こっそりと私にだけ打ち明ける人もた
くさんいます。そういう人たちに出会うたびに、私との違いは育ってきた環境であ
る、朝鮮学校に通ったかどうかであると思うのです。 
私と同じように、子供たちにも朝鮮学校で言葉を学び、歴史を知り、自分に誇りや
自信を持って生きてほしいし、素晴らしい友人たちにも出会ってほしい。 
また、朝鮮学校の大切にする、自分のためだけではなく、周りの人たちのために自
分の力を使うことを学んでほしいと思います。 
自分のコミュニティや環境をいとおしく思い、そこに自分の力を使える人になって
ほしいと願います。 
 
12.国際マスコミと日本マスコミしばしばは「朝鮮学校は北朝鮮の宣伝だ」と言
っています。自分の経験に基づいて、その発言に賛成していますか。 
いいえ、賛成していません。 
学校はどこの国であっても、宣伝機関ではありませんし、宣伝機関になどなれませ
ん。色んな子供たちが通う学校で、私たちは毎日子供たちと向き合ってきました。 
子供たちもそのようなニュースを聞きながら育ち、朝鮮という国に対して良いイメ
ージを持っていない子供たちがたくさんいます。 
私たちも子供たちを宣伝として利用したことなど一度もありませんし、子供たちに
対して偏ったイメージを植え付けたりなどしたことがありません。 
朝鮮学校という場所に来て、子供たちと話したことがある人ならばすぐにわかりま
す。朝鮮学校は本当に、「朝鮮人が朝鮮人になるための、ただの学校」であるとい
うことを。 
子供たちは日本のアイドルや韓国のアイドルが好きで、鞄には K-POP アイドルの名
前やバッジをつけていたり、日本のアイドルのファイルなどを使っています。 
本当に朝鮮学校が朝鮮という国の宣伝機関であるならば、そのようなことが許され
るでしょうか？ 
私たちは朝鮮という国についても、韓国、日本、その他の国についても教えます。 
朝鮮という国について教える比重が大きいのは自分の祖国であるからで、それは日
本の高校が日本の歴史を詳しく教えることと同じであり、宣伝のためとは言えない
と思います。 
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13.朝鮮総連の会員ですか。其れなら、会員では、何をしますか。 
会員という言い方がどうかはわかりませんが、今は会員ではないと思います。どこ
にも所属していません。 
その会に属すると、会議に参加したり、イベントに参加したりします。 
 
 
14.朝鮮学校と朝鮮総連の問題について、例えば朝鮮総連の警察捜査や朝鮮学校
の政府出資問題、意見はどうですか。 
どれも日本という国が朝鮮総連、朝鮮学校という、日本にとって邪魔なもの、負の
遺産である過去の歴史を直視させるものをなくそうとする施策であり、朝鮮総連が
違法な団体でもなんでもないことはすぐにわかることです。 
どこの学校も何らかの団体と関係を持っており、どこの民族学校も自分の国と深く
つながっています。それは当たり前のことなのです。 
にもかかわらず、メディアを通して「北朝鮮」「朝鮮」と名前のつくものは全て悪
いもののように宣伝をし、在日コリアンを苦しめることは、腹立たしいです。 
日本が行っている行為は国連でも常に非難されてきました。 
国が堂々と一つの国や学校を差別している、その状況こそが私たちを苦しめていま
す。 
しかし私が朝鮮学校に通わず、朝鮮学校や朝鮮総連についても知らなければ、朝鮮
という国をおそれ、朝鮮総連を不気味な団体と思い、朝鮮学校は奇妙な学校だと思
ったことでしょう。 
それこそが日本の狙いであると思います。 
 
15.朝鮮総連・朝鮮学校について誤解が多くて、ほかの人に何かを教えたいんで
すか。 
私が伝えたいことは、朝鮮総連も朝鮮学校も、ただただ日本に暮らす朝鮮人たちが
朝鮮人として生きていくために必要なものだということです。 
戦争が終わって以降、ずっと在日コリアンたちは支えあって生きてきました。ひど
い差別を受けながら、一つ一つ権利を勝ち取り、言葉を取り戻し、歴史を取り戻し、
戦い続けてきました。 
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私たちは日本という国が嫌いで戦っているのではありません。 
日本という国が私たちが私たちのまま生きていくことをよしとしないので、戦うし
かないのです。 
私たちは何も特別なことを望んでいません。 
全ての人に当然与えられた権利を、私たちも同じように行使したいだけです。 
私たちの権利を誰かに踏みにじられたくないだけです。 
そのために、学校や組織が必要なのです。 
個人の力ではどうにもできないことを、これまでに解決してきました。 
偏見を持たずに、目の前の私たちや朝鮮総連、朝鮮学校と向き合ってほしいです。 
なぜなら私たち一人一人が組織を作り、学校を構成しているからです。 
目の前の私たちと出会えば、総連や学校がどのような団体か分かるはずです。 
そのようなことを伝えたいです。 
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Interview Ms D 
[For this interview I was obligated to submit questions beforehand, and Ms D was only 
comfortable with being interviewed if the one who arranged the interview was there to 
interpret.] 
M: I don’t necessarily need to know like, specifically which schools she went to but I’m more 
interested to know if she did it all the way from kindergarten to university, and, I don’t know 
how old her child is but if that is the same trajectory that he or she will go to, and if it is most 
common that they stay from kindergarten to daigakkō. 
First generation to be born in Japan. So, she didn’t go to kindergarten but then from middle 
school to university it was Chōsen gakkō. One of the irregular things was that because of her 
father’s job she went temporarily overseas to France for one year. She has three children the 
eldest is in sixth grade (12 years), second child is turning nine years old, the third one is in 
nursery now, and in April he is going to primary school. So, all the kids are going from 
elementary school to Chōsen gakkō, but Japanese kindergarten. Her idea is to continue 
sending them at least up until high school for a couple of reasons. One is that, well, they are 
actually already the fourth generation, so it is in fact natural, they were born in Japan, they 
live in Japan, they were integrated in Japanese culture as anyone would expect. But at the 
same time, you know, what we have witnessed especially in the past decade is so terrible the 
way in which Koreans have lived, so it is really tough for them […] to be Korean. It wasn’t 
their choice, but it just so happened that when they were born they were Zainichi, so it is not 
their choice either, the challenges for them to be able to accept that fact as something positive 
and how can you do that? And perhaps one possibility or, or one way is to attend an ethnic 
school and to formulate and develop.. 
M: your own identity? 
Yes, identity, in a consistent way, and especially if you are an adolescent changing to a 
different school system can be disrupting. So, with all those considerations that’s why she 
says up to high school.  
M: and so afterward they can choose whether they want to, like, go to a Japanese university 
or to a Korean University 
Yes, you can’t control （コントロール）them afterwards (laughs) 
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M: Yes of course (laughs) 
And, another thing I need to add, is, this is related with question number 7 but in fact in the 
neighborhood the kids, some of the kids out there, the Japanese ones said “Oh return home” 
that sort of thing, remarks. 
M: Oh god.. That’s horrible. 
That really adds to not just the general political climate but also in the society. 
M: yeah, yeah that’s horrible. So, with her whole experience of going through like, the whole 
schools and university what she like, third question (on the sheet) 
Yes, what I interpret here is that it is about like, an alternative. 
M: Yes, because for instance, I don’t know specifically how it is but I am guessing that 
Korean schools are mainly for Zainichi Koreans so you wouldn’t really interact with 
Japanese students on a day to day basis, and if that would, like, if you would ever feel that is 
something that you missed out on. 
So missing out on by not going to.. 
M: yes, or gained something that you couldn’t have had you gone to a Japanese (one), yeah. 
So first, of all, what she gained by going there. Well first of all, in the Japanese public school 
there are very few teachers who can teach or know about the history and background of 
Zainichi, so then it is very difficult to be accepted, not only by other children but also by the 
teachers and by the school. So, in that sense it is very tough. On the other hand, or in contrast, 
if you were in Chōsen gakkō, you don’t have to explain anything. 
M: you can just be you. 
You can be yourself and everyone understands you while you are there, so that sort of 
acceptance is very valuable and something that you just can’t expect from Japanese schools, 
and in this case she sort of recognizes how important, not so much during her time in school 
but rather afterwards, after studying, getting a job, or after sending her own kids to school that 
the difference is stark. And in her family, her parents went to Japanese schools and 
experienced various types of discrimination, and that also motivated her parents to send them 
to ethnic school. 
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M: I can understand that, yes. 
That is the most important part but of course if you just compare the schools or school system 
there are different subjects or different extracurricular activities, you know, special ethnic, 
culture clubs. 
M: Korean language and such? 
Yes, those things. 
M: I guess that relates directly to the fourth question, because I read this report by the TMG 
and it is basically a whole Chōsen gakkō no chōsa 
By the TMG? 
M: Yeah, because they wrote it to assess whether the schools could get subsidy in Tokyo, but 
it is a really, like, I read the whole document and it is really strange because, of course, the 
only thing they assess is whether it is a good enough school to be able to apply for those 
subsidies. But then they show you the curriculum, and it is much like a regular curriculum, 
just, indeed with like Korean history but then they only focus their whole report on “ but in 
kindergarten or primary school they have to sing nursery rhymes about Kim Il-Sung or Kim 
Jong-Il and it is very focused on that, and that makes it seem as if the whole school is only 
doing that the whole time. Instead of, because that is what I am wondering about, like, was 
that really such a big part of the education or is that being blown up by the government a bit 
so that they can kind of push their own agenda more? 
I see. They protested the report. What do you include in the curriculum, like the subjects? 
M: basically, everything that is mandatory within the school, so like the mandatory program 
you have to follow. 
Okay so we are now at number four, so the core of this question would be what do you 
remember? So is it like a strong impression? 
M: So it is also related to what I said about the nursery rhymes like, was it really strongly 
focused on North Korea, or did she feel like it was a regular school but also with Korean 
language and Korean history. Because the report makes it seem like ideology is a really 
strong point as if if you go to that school then no doubt you’re going to move to North Korea 
and live there for the rest of your life, so it makes it seem like, black and white, like either you 
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go to a Japanese school and you are a good, liberal Japanese citizen and you turn out to be, I 
don’t know, a communist or something (laughs) 
Ms D and others strongly protested against that particular report so that well, for you too, I 
can see that you critically read that, but at the same time it is somewhat uncomfortable for 
someone to say “well according to the TMG report such and such and is it true?”  because the 
way the report was written was really, really, uh, yeah, uh, problematic. And in fact, I 
(interpreter) haven’t looked at that report, so they count the number of times the particular 
name Kim Il-Sung is mentioned in the music text or something, well that sort of approach is 
not, uh, well, it is contradictory to the very definition by the Japanese government which is 
that, you, from the, currently, Chōsen gakkō is nothing other than the miscellaneous school, 
that category right, 
M: yeah. The lady from HURAK told me that it is the same as a driving school. Which is the 
strangest thing because to me it seems that you wouldn’t allow citizens of your country to take 
their complete education in something that you would classify in the same way as a driving 
school. 
Yes, because they don’t want to formally recognize it. And the point here is that, despite the 
fact that they categorize Chōsen gakkō as just a miscellaneous school, if that is the case, in the 
case of a miscellaneous school, the content of the education does not matter, it is up to you. 
But nevertheless, they try to intervene in the content of what is taught, so that is contradictory 
in the stance already. So that is why they are really angry about what they are doing now. So 
that report was temporarily withdrawn but after Koike came into office… now it is up again. 
And it seems that that report does have an impact on the attitude of the TMG so that now the 
Zainichi community really fears that this could get into a much bigger situation where it is not 
just about subsidy but even, yeah , about the existence itself. Whether they might withdraw 
the license itself. 
M: It was so badly written. 
This is the really difficult part cause whenever we talk about Chōsen gakkō, it is always about 
“ oh Chōsen gakkō and therefore North Korea relations so on and so forth. That sort of 
association or that.. even the questions can be offending or uncomfortable, that’s one thing I 
need to say. Not that you can’t (laughs) 
M: No, no I understand (laughs) 
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So that is one thing. First of all we talked about the background of it. First there is a history, 
the reason why their portraits are there. It goes back to the colonialism and it goes back to 
1945, and you know, the, right after the, end of the occupation, Korean schools, hundreds or 
so Korean schools were started here and there, but then under GHQ they were closed, so all 
this post-war struggle of ethnic schools. And eventually, while they are struggling financially, 
we know now that in 1957 was when the scholarship started to come from the North, so when 
you put it in that sort of perspective, you know, for the Zainichi Koreans, that was really, you 
know, how they were helped to continue with the ethnic education within Japan in such an 
adversely condition. So that appreciation or gratitude is really big, especially for the first 
generation and second generation. Especially for the first generation who first led these 
schools, you know, why not put the portraits there. And yet, with all the discussion on North 
Korean schools in Japan, you just point to the portraits, as if that was the core of the thing, 
Just ideology is where the basic problem lies, uh, and if you think of it, well in Indian school 
you see Gandhi, in other international schools you might see various Christian references, but 
you don't start counting how many times the name of Jesus was mentioned in the curriculum, 
you know, dozens of times. So for many of the parents, they really want their children to learn 
about their ethnic roots and about their cultural heritage, uh, culture and language. And if that 
is the wish of the parents, that is when it is even more offending.. 
M: Because it is saying that they're raising their children wrong? 
Yes. That's right. And, uh, speaking of the actual content of the textbooks, she says, compared 
with her days, which was more during the Cold War era, there is a lot of change, so that, in a 
way, a lot of things about the North Korean state has been relativised, it is not as absolute, and 
Kim Il-Sung may be still a very important people, but for instance other, Japanese 
independent heroes are mentioned as well. So for her children, the current generation, Kim Il 
Sung already is like a distant figure. In response to that, she feels that it is important for her 
children to learn about Kim Il-Sung, as well, as, you know, what kind of person he was and 
what he did. So that is how she feels about that. On a more practical level, with this 
curriculum change, she feels that there is a generational change, the children's family 
experience's different. So in the past those children couldn't write or read but at least they 
heard the Korean language from their parents. But now, the parents were born here, and 
teachers, you know, were also born here, so third generation Koreans, so it's really like 
learning a foreign language, so the learning styles itself have been changing. You have to start 
with, how do you speak, hearing, listening. So that sort of teaching methods shifted as well. 
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M: Thank you, that covers those questions. 
So 2003 was a major curriculum change, oh I mean, textbook changes, in terms of nuance. 
When it comes to science, technology, maths, those textbooks really are, uh, almost similar to 
the Japanese ones, which is recognized by the actual public schools, the real schools, not the 
miscellaneous schools. 
M: So questions 7 and 8 are kind of like the same question. Well I guess not the same question 
but about her children and about her, so, like she said with the "go back to your own 
country"-thing. Have they ever, because, when I was at Choudai, there were a lot of female 
students who wear, I think it is called hanbok? 
Ah yes, chima chogori. 
M: Who said like, okay so we have this uniform and whenever we walk to school people 
immediately know that we go to this school, and that like, gets them a lot of comments 
etcetera etcetera. Did she ever experience something like that and do her children experience 
that now? Or did she ever find it, maybe difficult, to get a job because of the background, you 
know, was there ever institutional discrimination? 
That return home-remark was about 5 years ago. So there are two examples here, one is about 
that, uh, return home-remark, and that happened in a park in the neighborhood, and that was 
the eldest son when he about seven years old, and the other boy was someone he didn't know, 
they just met in the park. He was like "oh where are you from?" so that's how it started the 
conversation, and uh, uh, he said he is from Chōsen, and the other boy said "oh Chōsen.. then 
you should go back home". No wait, no, the conversation was like this "which school do you 
go to?", and he said "oh I go to that Chōsen school" "Ah, so you must be Chōsenjin then, go 
back home" that was the in the park incident. And another example is that, with her, when, I 
mean in North Korea, a high government official, when there were all these death penalties, 
maybe you remember Jang Song Thaek, he got killed and that news was heavily covered in 
the Japanese media. So when her son was at the neighbors' house, and they were talking 
informally about it, and someone said "oh you're a foreigner right?" "Ah.. Chōsen" and this 
was like a junior high school student telling him "in your country, the president killed an 
elderly man, didn't he?" that sort of thing. The way he was spoken to was very blunt and very 
impolite. And after that, he asked his mom "oh was there such an incident in North Korea?" 
So obviously that kind of incident, very much uh, must be very confusing, to him. So it's just, 
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you know, difficult to, sort of, sort out. And you need some sort of media, every media to 
cover it from both sides. And it seems as if the kids were thrown into such, such a swirl, like 
you drown. 
M: Like you get pulled in to it anyway. 
Yes. As for the first incident, what happened afterwards was, because he said he attends this 
school, that's why he was told go back home, so uh, afterwards, he became more strategic so 
that when somebody who doesn't know asks something like that, he would say oh I go to 
XXX which is a Japanese school. But of course, in a different setting such as a karate dojo, 
where everyone already knows each other, then he doesn't have to, or it is okay to disclose, 
because already other kids know where he is from or where he, which school he attends. So 
depending on the situation he behaved, he is learned the switching.   
Some questions were combined now in that it, so I can start by going back now to, number 3, 
we talked earlier about what she gained, but in terms of what she missed out on, it is not so 
much missed, but what she faced. Because she went to an ethnic school and the first and 
foremost was the lack of options in terms of education. So during those days she couldn’t get 
a chance to sit for, what they call, the certification, for the, uh, going to college. 
M: to take an entrance exam? 
To take an entrance exam. In those days she had to go to like a double school, she also went 
to the Japanese high school in order to get a certificate for the graduation from high school in 
Japan, so that sort of institutional limitations was starker in her days, compared to what the 
kids experience. If you talk about the general trend, during the 1990s, a lot of improvement 
was made, such as, as we talked about earlier, the ethnic school teams became able to 
participate in national tournaments, or that universities started to accept applicants from ethnic 
schools to sit for entrance exams. 
M: So, if they went to Chosen high school, can they now just take the entrance exam? 
Mostly. Mostly. Now, it is not automatic, but they have to apply for a screening, a special 
screening, case by case, but in many cases, they are able to sit for it. And some private 
universities do the same or say that they include them to apply. So, there’s procedures now so 
that it is possible. But some schools still reject, like outright rejection. It’s possible. In that 
sort of options or opportunities, generally we see that they are broadening; more acceptance, 
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but that was, mainly during the 1990s, and we witnessed during the 2000s it was like the 
reverse course. 
M: Especially under Abe? 
It started with the abduction issues. It had a very strong impact in that, they were demonizing 
North Korea as such, and ethnic school as well. And this caused stress in the high school 
education in Japan, but they tried to accept it, the ethnic Korean schools in Japan. That sort of 
exception makes the way Chōsen gakkō is treated even more pronounced than in other places. 
And once her kid says, well this often happens in other Japanese kids as well, the kids 
suddenly say “I don’t want to go to school” so at one time it happened and at that time he said 
“Well after all, the Japanese government’s attitude would not change right? So, what’s the 
point?” So, it really shows how children even feel the way that the power, the authority treats 
them. And how they are the ones who got discriminated. As minorities, it is almost impossible 
to fight back, because they are so powerful. You just feel so powerless. So, uh, you see how, 
this whole institutional discrimination treatment really directly goes into the minds of the 
children. 
M: With this we covered question 9 as well. On to question 10. I was basically just wondering 
if.. 
Now it is getting kind of difficult.. so yeah.. number 10… 
M: I was wondering, because, I’m guessing most of the people who send their children to 
Chōsen gakkō are also a member of Chōsen Sōren and I was wondering what that specifically 
means, like, do you have to go to meetings or do you pay contribution. What does it mean to 
be like, a part of that system? 
Member means whether you pay the fees. There are lots of associations [shows schedule with 
all kinds of meetings]. There is a women’s association, a business association, you may be 
member of Sōren as well as member or employee of the business people’s association, under 
this umbrella. 
M: Is it a prerequisite for sending your children to Chōsen gakkō to be a member of Chōsen 
Sōren? 
There is no requirement or anything, but, but, certainly a certain proportion of the students are, 
you know, their parents are, members of Chōsen Sōren but, but, there are others as well, some 
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have South Korean nationality, some even Japanese or Nepalese, newcomer immigrants. So 
some prefer it there. 
M: I guess we talked about number 11 a bit as well, uhm, does it, well I am guessing it affects 
her, like immediately like not getting subsidy for three kids and I don’t know how much the 
subsidy is but I would expect that, talking financially, that it has a big impact on her life, right? 
So certainly, the impact of the subsidies is really big, and the financial situation is of course 
different depending on which person you’re talking about. When it comes to the rural areas, it 
is really getting serious because the number of students is low in the first place, so that they 
are at the point whether they can exist or not. And in fact, in XX prefecture they have 
suspended, temporary closed. There is now such schools here and there, or that the number of 
students is very, very low and it is just so that they have to close. One thing is that money, the 
direct impact of money not coming, but another, which might be even more serious, problem, 
is that because of this demonizing associations with North Korea, many parents now hesitate 
to send their children to the schools, and this contributes to the decline in the enrollment and 
therefore it is difficult to sustain the schools. These two things go together to create this real 
threat. And in the case of XX ward where is lives now, so XX ward, even though the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government tried not to pay anything, but the XX ward pays 11000 yen per 
student, so that is something unique to that ward. 
M: Is that the reason, one of the reasons she lives there? 
It is not just XX ward, but they started in in 1990s but all 23 wards pay this now. So this ward 
pays it, and all these parents pay tax to this ward, so it is only natural some compensation 
should come, but now that the situation of the Metropolitan government is so bad, that even 
this.. 
M: So the ward subsidy is separate from the Metropolitan subsidy? 
Yes. So the 11000 was first given to the parents, but because the financial situation if schools 
is so bad, parents then themselves contribute to the schools or the management of the schools. 
M: The amount of money that the ward pays, is that the same amount of money that the ward 
pays to the parents of children who go to Japanese schools? 
In general, for the Japanese student specifically is one million per student yearly, so that is the 
standard. 
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M: Okay, so this is a lot less. 
And depending on the local government, some local governments just don’t pay anything. 
The schools have to manage by themselves.  
M: Last question then! The people who will read the thing that I write, if anyone at all beside 
my supervisors (laughs) will be mostly Europeans, or Western people, and most people don’t 
even know that Chōsen gakkō exist. Whenever I walk about my subject to anyone they usually 
respond “Eh, how is that a thing?”, so what is something that she would want, that, she 
thinks is an important, you know, thing for other people to know about Chōsen gakkō or the 
whole situation, like, what is vital information for people to understand what is going on at 
the moment or to form an opinion about this? 
You talked about the European readership, so, in that context, you know, with this issue, 
immigration and refugees coming up all over. It is an important issue. So, there is relevance to 
that context. More and more people, immigrants, there is always some groups of people for 
whom just the ordinary standard educational system for citizens of that country may not be 
the most appropriate. Then you need something alternative. Be it ethnic education or whatever 
you call it, and in most societies still there is this strong line of public education system where 
the ultimate purpose is to develop their national identity, to be a citizen of their national state. 
In Japan in particular, this notion of the nation stated called Japan, being ethnic Japanese, that 
is very strong, and that leads to such oppression. And in this particular case, as she sees it, the 
way the Japanese government intervenes into the Korean ethnic education, is, uh, really, 
inappropriate and uh, what’s a good word, they shouldn’t be doing this sort of thing, 
obviously, and it is very oppressive. It is very difficult, uh, experience, for those who are 
affected by it. But, uh, at the same time, what is the positive aspect of it, as we started out 
today, to see the kids being accepted as they are. To be able to see that, uh, is what motivates 
the people in that community. The need and value of such alternative education system is 
something that the broader readership could appreciate. Even if readers are not familiar with 
Japan or the context, here she would like to tell them that there is something like this going on. 
Their fight, their struggle, to continue with this type of ethnic education. 
M: Alright, thank you so much!  
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Interview Ms E 
1. 幼稚園から、大学まで朝鮮学校に出席しましたか。どの朝鮮学校に出席ましたか。 
 岡山朝鮮初中級学校（初・中）⇒広島朝鮮初中高級学校（高）⇒朝鮮大学校 
 
2. その体験の時に、あなたはあなたの教育によって、何かを失っていると感じるこ
とはありましたか？または、何かを得たと感じることはありましたか？ 
 失っていると感じたこと：特になし 
 得たと感じること：民族的アイデンティティ、人間同士の強い繋がり、在日朝鮮
人社会を守っていこうという強い信念 
 
3. 朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学の課程について、何を覚えていますか。課程はいろいろな明
確な性情がありましたか。その課程について、Eさんの意見は何ですか。 
 朝鮮語の授業や音楽の授業、英語の授業、日本語の授業…どれも楽しかった。先
生たちは、どの教科も熱心に教えてくれた。日本の学校に通ったことがないので
（大学院以外）、朝鮮学校の課程の特徴と言われてもよくわからない。朝鮮学校で
の教育のおかげで幅広い知識や教養を身につけられたと思っている。 
 
4.朝鮮学校の時に、差別を感じました？どうでしたか。その後で、例えば、就職活
動の時に、朝鮮学校の教育ので、差別を感じましたか。例を教えてくださいますか。 
 感じた。チマ・チョゴリで通学しているときに、日本人と思われる人から敵意を
込めた目で睨まれたことを覚えている（中級部２年の頃）。 
 
5. 朝鮮大学について何もあまり知りません。どうでしたか。日本の大学と同じの課
程がありますか。ほかのの大学に出席したければ、それは可能でしたか。 
 非常に教養の高い教授たちがおり、とても高い水準の教育を受けられたと思って
いる。他の日本の大学にも引けを取らないと思う。他の大学に行こうと思えば、一
生懸命勉強をすれば、可能だったと思う。 
 
6. 卒業の後で、朝鮮総連とか朝鮮学校とか、規則がありますか。例えば、朝鮮総連
で働ければならないで、料金を支払えばならないでいますか。 
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 特にない。 
 
7. 可能なら、子供を持っていれば、子供に朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学を通わせりますか。
どうしてですか。 
 通わせる。理由は、①日本の学校では日本中心的な教育しか得られず、アジアの
近現代史もしっかり学べず、在日朝鮮人であることについての自尊心を育めないた
め。②朝鮮学校では、朝鮮の歴史、言葉、文化を学べ、自尊心を育めるため。 
 
8. 国際マスコミと日本マスコミしばしばは「朝鮮学校は北朝鮮の宣伝だ」と言って
います。Eさんの体験に基づいて、その発言に賛成していますか。 
 朝鮮学校と DPRK に強い繋がりがあることは間違いない。なので、DPRK のことにつ
いて学ぶのも自然なこと。それをプロパガンダと見るかどうかは、その人（メディ
ア）の DPRKへの偏見によりけりだと思う。 
 
9. 朝鮮総連の会員ですか。其れなら、会員では、何をしますか。 
 私は朝鮮総連傘下の団体の専従職員です。朝鮮総連の活動方針に大きく沿う形で
団体独自の活動方針を決め、それに沿った仕事をします。 
 
10. 朝鮮学校と朝鮮総連の問題について、例えば朝鮮総連の警察捜査や朝鮮学校の
政府出資問題、意見はどいですか。 
 日本政府は歴史的に在日朝鮮人の民族団体や民族学校について弾圧を続けてきて
おり、それは現在も変わっていない。強制捜査や補助金の打ち切りなどは、すべて
日本政府の恣意的・政治的・差別的な行為であり、国際人権基準に照らせば、あか
らさまな差別であり、許されないことと考える。 
 
11. 朝鮮総連・朝鮮学校について誤解が多くて、ほかの人に何かを教えたいんです
か。 
 朝鮮総連は、在日朝鮮人の権益保護のために活動する民族団体であり、人々がイ
メージとして抱くような恐ろしい団体ではないということ。朝鮮学校も、在日朝鮮
人が民族的アイデンティティを維持するための唯一無二の教育の場であることを伝
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えたい。そして、日本政府がいかに朝鮮総連・朝鮮学校に対して差別的な政策を取
っているかを知ってもらいたい。 
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Interview Mr F 
1. 幼稚園から、大学まで朝鮮学校に出席しましたか。どの朝鮮学校に出席ましたか。 
（「幼稚園から、大学まで朝鮮学校に通学しましたか。どの朝鮮学校に通学しまし
たか。」という質問として、回答します。） 
・小学１年生から大学４年生まで朝鮮学校に通いました。 
・小中学校：北陸朝鮮初中級学校 
 高校：愛知朝鮮中高級学校 
 大学：朝鮮大学校 
 
2. その体験の時に、あなたはあなたの教育によって、何かを失っていると感じるこ
とはありましたか？または、何かを得たと感じることはありましたか？ 
（「朝鮮学校の通学経験をふり返って、朝鮮学校特有の教育によって、何かを習得
し損じたと感じることはありますか？または、何かを習得し得たと感じることはあ
りますか？」という質問として、回答します。） 
 何かを習得し損じたこと感じることはありません。 
 何かを習得し得たことは沢山ありますが、主には以下です。 
①他人と自分を比較するのではなく、一人一人が大切な個人である（したがっ
て、自分も大切であるし、他人も大切である）ということを学べたこと 
②物事を他覚的にとらえられるようになったこと（少なくとも、その努力が必要
であると感じられるようになったこと） 
③日本学校では決して学べない歴史や文化、言語を習得できたこと 
 
 
3. 朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学の課程について、何を覚えていますか。課程はいろいろな明
確な性情がありましたか。その課程について、Fさんの意見は何ですか。  
（「朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学のカリキュラムについて、覚えていることはありますか。
特筆すべき特徴はありましたか。カリキュラムについて、白充さんのご意見をお聞
かせください。」という質問として、回答します。） 
・カリキュラムについていえば、朝鮮半島の歴史や文化、言語を学べること、相対
評価（偏差値教育）ではなく、絶対評価であったことを覚えています。 
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・特徴は沢山ありますが、質問２の①～③は、日本学校にはない特徴だと思いま
す。 
・いわれてみれば（国や地方自治体から補助金等が出なかったので）理科系科目に
使う実験道具が古かったり無かったりしました。補助金等がもう少ししっかり出れ
ば、カリキュラムどおりの実験等ができたのに…と思いました。 
 
4. 朝鮮学校の時に、差別を感じました？どうでしたか。その後で、例えば、就職活
動の時に、朝鮮学校の教育ので、差別を感じましたか。例を教えてくださいますか。 
（「学生時代、あるいは卒業後（例えば、就職活動の際）、朝鮮学校に通っている
ことで差別をされたと感じたことはありましたか？具体例があれば教えてくださ
い。」という質問として、回答します。） 
・北陸朝鮮初中級学校に通っている頃、学校近くのガードレールに「朝鮮バカ死
ね」と書かれたことがありました。 
・また、朝鮮学校には（日本学校に支給されているような）補助金等が支給されて
いないことも、差別だと感じました。 
・他方、就職活動などの際に、朝鮮学校に通っていたという理由で差別を受けたこ
とはありません。 
 
5. 朝鮮大学について何もあまり知りません。どうでしたか。日本の大学と同じの課
程がありますか。ほかのの大学に出席したければ、それは可能でしたか。 
（「朝鮮大学については、あまり知られていません。日本の大学と同じようなカリ
キュラムはありますか。ほかの大学の授業に出席したければ、それは可能でした
か。」という質問として、回答します。） 
・日本の大学に通ったことがないので、分かりません。 
・ほかの大学の授業に出席したいと思わなかったので、分かりません。 
 ただ、「ほかの大学の授業に出席したらいけない」という規則はありませんでし
た。なので、出席しようと思えば出席できたのでは無いでしょうか。（当該他大学
の規則上、出席可能かどうかという別の問題はありますが） 
 もっとも、他の大学に出席することで単位を認めるというような、「単位交換制
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度」のようなものは、少なくとも僕の時代はありませんでした。 
 
6. 卒業の後で、朝鮮総連とか朝鮮学校とか、規則がありますか。例えば、朝鮮総連
で働ければならないで、料金を支払えばならないでいますか。 
（「朝鮮大学校を卒業した後について、何らかの規則はありますか。例えば、一定
期間朝鮮総連で働ければならなかったり、何らかの金員を納付しなければならなか
ったりしますか。」という質問として、回答します。） 
全くありません。 
 
7. 可能なら、子供を持っていれば、子供に朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学を通わせりますか。
どうしてですか。 
（「子供を（あるいは、もし子どもがいれば）朝鮮学校・朝鮮大学校に通わせたい
ですか。どうしてですか。」という質問として、回答します。） 
・通わせたいと思います。 
・朝鮮学校で育まれる価値観に同意するからです（日本学校で育まれる価値観に同
意しにくいからです） 
 
8. 国際マスコミと日本マスコミしばしばは「朝鮮学校は北朝鮮の宣伝だ」と言って
います。Fさんの体験に基づいて、その発言に賛成していますか。 
（「日本や海外のマスコミは、しばしば「朝鮮学校は北朝鮮のプロパガンダである
（北朝鮮のプロパガンダとして機能している）」と報道します。白充さんの体験に
基づいて、このような報道に賛成しますか。」という質問として、回答します。） 
・賛成しません。 
・そもそも、「北朝鮮のプロパガンダである」が何を意味しているのかが良く分か
りません。 
 むしろそのような曖昧な報道自体が、「北朝鮮に悪いイメージを植え付けようと
するプロパガンダである」と考えています。 
 
9. 現在、北朝鮮のミサイルと核兵器はニュースでたくさんあります。朝鮮総連と挑
戦学校の反応はどうですか。 
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（「報道によると、現在、北朝鮮にはミサイルや核兵器がたくさんあるといわれて
います。朝鮮総連や朝鮮学校の反応はどうですか。」という質問として、回答しま
す。） 
・現在、朝鮮学校に通っていませんし、勤務先が総連な訳でもないので、分かりま
せん。ところで、これは私の英語力の問題かも知れませんが、そもそも「反応はど
うですかについて、どのように返答すれば良いか、答えに窮します。朝鮮学校や総
連が何らかの声明を出した訳でもないですし（そもそも出さないでしょうし）、リ
アクションは人それぞれだと思います。 
・ただ、個人的には、「北朝鮮」よりも、米国や中国の方が、ミサイルや核兵器を
たくさん持っていると考えています。 
 
10.朝鮮総連の会員ですか。其れなら、会員では、何をしますか。 
（「朝鮮総連の会員ですか。もしそうであれば、会員としてどのような活動をして
いますか。」という質問として、回答します。） 
・はい。具体的には朝鮮総連傘下の在日本朝鮮人人権協会の会員です。 
・特にこれといった活動はできていません。 
 
11. 朝鮮学校と朝鮮総連の問題について、例えば朝鮮総連の警察捜査や朝鮮学校の
政府出資問題、意見はどいですか。 
（「朝鮮学校や朝鮮総連を取り巻く問題について、どのように考えていますか。例
えば、朝鮮総連に対する警察の捜査や、朝鮮学校（の保護者）に対する公的資金が
カットされることなどついて、意見を聞かせてください。」という質問として、回
答します。） 
・差別であり、弾圧であり、「北朝鮮は悪である」のプロパガンダであると考えて
います。 
 
12.朝鮮総連・朝鮮学校について誤解が多くて、ほかの人に何かを教えたいんですか。 
（「朝鮮総連・朝鮮学校について知って欲しいことはありますか。」という質問と
して、回答します。） 
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・総連、朝鮮学校がある理由 
・総連、朝鮮学校といっても、そこに属し、通う、一人一人が異なった個性を持っ
た人（人間）であるということ 
・朝鮮学校が大切にする価値観 
・まずは「総連や朝鮮学校は歪んだ、間違った学校である」という前提（先入観）
を持たずに、総連や朝鮮学校を見て欲しいということ 
・そして、最後には、「日本人とはどういう人間か？」「オランダ人とはどういう
人間か？」という質問に答え（正答）がないように、「在日朝鮮人はどういう人間
か？」「朝鮮学校出身者はどういう人間か？」という質問にも答えがないというこ
とを分かっていただきたいです。 
 
 
 
 
 
